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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda I. Seligman

Howard Fuller, a long-time community activist born in Shreveport, Louisiana and
raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has become a nationally renowned advocate for school
choice. Coming from humble beginnings, Fuller learned from his tight-knit community
growing up that he could be anything he wanted to be if he worked hard enough and
focused on his education. Wanting future generations of black Americans to have the
same opportunities he had, Fuller would dedicate his life work to uplifting his people
through education. How Fuller approached that work, however, led to seemingly
contradicting approaches and ideas. This thesis attempts to make sense of Howard
Fuller’s life and activism, and explain how his choices and activism evolved over time.
From fighting for integrating schools in Cleveland, Ohio, to opening an all-black
university in Durham, North Carolina, to becoming superintendent of Milwaukee Public
Schools, Howard Fuller has shifted his tactics on how to provide low-income blacks with
quality educational opportunities. All of Fuller’s work has led him to now, fighting for
school choice as a way to give low-income blacks a chance to earn the best education
possible. At seventy-one years old Howard Fuller is still fighting, and still working to
uplift his race and improve their life chances. Howard Fuller is a dedicated race man, and
this thesis is his story.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The dominant narrative of the Civil Rights struggle in the United States has been
told primarily through the lens of the South. In the twenty-first century, historians are
attempting to complicate that narrative, doing extensive research about the movement in
the North and West and making comparisons to the southern version. These historians are
exploring the idea that the Northern movement was not a result of, or in response to, the
activism that was taking place in the South, but its own movement that started well before
the well-documented struggles of the 1960s.1 In his recent synthesis of the northern
movement, Thomas Sugrue explains “our histories—and our collective memories—of the
civil rights era do not reflect the national scope of racial inequality and the breadth of
challenges to it…Most histories focus on the South and the epic battles between
nonviolent protestors and the defenders of Jim Crow during the 1950s and 1960s.”2 The
movement in the North is not a story of one single struggle, or one approach, to facilitate
change. The formerly prevalent interpretation was that non-violent direct action through
the mid-1960s led to inaction and slow change, which led to an abandonment of that
approach. This interpretation overlooks many important aspects and viewpoints of
leaders in the struggle. The fight for equal opportunity in education was part of this
battle, with the Supreme Court deciding in the Brown v. Board of Education3 case in
1954 that separate school accommodations were inherently unequal, deeming them
1

See Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North
(New York: Random House, 2009); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in
Postwar New York City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Jerald Podair, The Strike that
Changed New York (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); and Freedom North: Black Freedom
Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 ed. Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (New York:
Palgrave Macmillin, 2003),
2
Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, xi.
3
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), United States Reports.
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unconstitutional. Because schools in the North were not directly in the scope of the
Brown decision, the future of schools in the North and the direction they should take to
obtain equal opportunity was up in the air.
The question of how to approach Northern schools was not answered in unison by
any faction of the communities involved in those schools. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
school reform leaders had to interpret the Brown decision to facilitate change in their
public school district, and different leaders sought different approaches to these changes
based on their own life experiences. As historian Jack Dougherty said in discussing
Milwaukee’s reform activists, “the Brown decision—touched all of their lives, but
activists from various generations interpreted its meaning in different ways as they
encountered changing forms of racism over time.”4 Howard Fuller, who migrated to
Milwaukee from Shreveport, Louisiana as a boy in 1948, has been an integral reformer of
Milwaukee Public Schools, and exemplifies the evolving approaches one man can have
towards reforming urban education in order to advance his race. Fuller’s varied
approaches to advancing his race through educational opportunities must be examined
and explained to show how one man could have taken such different approaches to
change in one lifetime.
Martha Biondi’s work To Stand and Fight: the Struggle for Civil Rights in New
York City, demonstrated that it is more helpful when discussing the Civil Rights
movement to talk about the North and South simultaneously rather than the former being
a result of the latter. She explained that discriminatory practices in New York City (in
employment, housing, schools, and politics) all required race-conscious remedies that

4
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shifted over time.5 She also emphasized the point that all black activists during the
movement did not think alike. From blacks on the communist left to those unwilling to
identify with such a political ideology, Biondi showed the complications of the Civil
Rights movement. Howard Fuller’s life encompasses these complex approaches and
shows that the Civil Rights movement not only varied between regions or groups, but
within one man over the course of his career.
When Howard Fuller moved to Cleveland, Ohio to attend Western Reserve
University in 1962, he became involved in the city’s school integration movement. As
president of the student senate in the school of social work, Fuller was involved in
organizing students to protest the building of a school in a predominantly black
neighborhood on the basis that the student body would also be black. At this point in his
life, Fuller believed getting black students into classrooms with white students was the
key to providing them access to resources that were disproportionately being given to
white schools with white students. He also believed in the power of non-violence.6 When
Fuller moved to Durham, North Carolina in 1964, he took a job with Operation
Breakthrough, a local office of the national War on Poverty Program, which was focused
on community action.7 In Durham, Fuller worked with families as well as within schools.
He saw black schools closing and their students being sent to white schools, and saw that
in these integrated schools, black students were disproportionately being taught in

5

Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: the Struggle for Civil Rights in New York City (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003).
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Howard Fuller, interview by Jack Dougherty (transcript), in More Than One Struggle Oral
History Project Records 1995, Manuscript Collection 217, Box 1, Folder 17, Golda Meir Library Archives,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, p 3.
7
Clipping, Tom Bamberger, “The Education of Howard Fuller,” Milwaukee Magazine, July 1988,
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4
special, separate classes.8 Seeing the resistance to equal opportunity in education in
integrated settings in traditional public schools as well as university settings, Fuller began
to see separate education for blacks, controlled by blacks, as a better way to create
opportunity.
Fuller opened and taught in an all-black university in Durham, North Carolina in
1969 and ran the university until it closed until 1973.9 He returned to Milwaukee and
soon became involved in a fight to keep one traditionally black neighborhood school
available to its neighborhood students, North Division High School: his own alma mater.
This change was the result of a court-ordered desegregation plan in Milwaukee that
would force neighborhood students to be bused out so that white students could be bused
in to obtain certain court-mandated levels of integration. This began a long stretch of
Fuller’s activism in Milwaukee, which would lead to a fight to create an all-black school
district, a demand for more accountability in the public schools, and eventually the
expansion of school choice options for parents whose public schools were clearly not
serving them.
Fuller is an important person to examine these approaches through because he
was not only involved in these fights; he was leading them. From heading the Coalition to
Save North Division to being appointed the Superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools,
to an eventual chairpersonship of a national group advocating for School Choice, Fuller
put himself at the forefront of every battle he saw being fought to provide educational
opportunities to low-income blacks. While his activism in later years involved different
strategies for racial advancement than his activism in early years, following Fuller’s life

8
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from Milwaukee to Cleveland to Durham and back again show that these varying
approaches had a constant theme: advancing his race.
According to historian Jonathon Coleman, writing about race relations in the
United States in the early 1990s through the lens of Milwaukee, one unfortunate
stereotype about black people is that “All black people think alike.”10 In his analysis of
Milwaukee, Coleman shows that this not true and has not been true since the beginning of
black political activism. Fuller, a visible man in Milwaukee’s black community since the
1970s, drew both criticism and acclaim for his approaches to reform and efforts to
improve the lives of low-income blacks among other politically active blacks. One Fuller
adversary in Milwaukee was a militant alderman named Michael McGee, who started and
led the Black Panther Militia chapter in the city. Fuller, who had built coalitions and
collaborated with people during his adult life, transcended racial divides when building
alliances. According to Coleman, “the path Fuller had chosen—to essentially work within
the mainstream—had elicited comments of ‘lackey’ and ‘hypocrite’ from McGee.”11 This
was reinforced when Fuller was appointed Superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools,
and the Greater Milwaukee Committee (a powerful group of white business leaders and
politicians in Milwaukee) “pronounced Fuller to be someone it could work with.”
According to Coleman, this was “the moment many in the black community became
suspicious and wary of him. If the powers that be anoint you, the paranoid thinking went,
who’s to say you’re going to represent the best interests of black people? What kind of
‘compromises’ have you made to become someone whites approve of and can work

10

Jonathan Coleman, Long Way to Go: Black and White in America (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1997), 37, emphasis in original.
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Ibid., 37.
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with?”12 This fed the idea that Fuller may be a “puppet for the white establishment,”13
which inhibited the racial solidarity Fuller sought in reforming the Milwaukee Public
Schools. His appointment frustrated other influential black Milwaukeeans. Jerrel Jones,
owner of WNOV, a black radio station in Milwaukee told Jonathan Coleman he was
disgusted with the appointment because it seemed that “whenever the city ‘needs a nigger
for something, they choose Howie.’”14 The divisive attitudes of activists in Milwaukee
hindered change and created battles between leaders who, at the core, wanted to improve
the situation for blacks in Milwaukee. This thesis will argue that Fuller’s approaches,
although drawing criticism from other black activists in the city, simply evolved to fit the
specific contexts he was fighting within.
Coleman’s analysis of both Fuller and his critics shows that Fuller’s life was full
of “radical and revolutionary” activism, combined with instances of collaboration and
coalition building.15 These changing approaches happened because of Fuller’s status as a
race man. Fuller, when explaining his self-identity as a race man, said that, “I think that I
do have a responsibility to be trying to help those of us [blacks within the community]
who reach out, that I have a direct responsibility to do that.”16 Sociologists St. Clair
Drake and Horace R. Cayton developed the term “race man” in their 1945 ethnographic
study Black Metropolis. They discussed the development of the race man in the context
of the “Midwest Metropolis,” citing that in these situations blacks lived “in a state of
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intense and perpetual awareness that they are a black minority in a white man’s world.”17
They explained that because America rejected them, but they did not want to reject
themselves, blacks tended to “fluctuate between shame and defiance.”18 In the 1920s and
1930s, this race consciousness developed into race pride with black leaders “perpetually
involved in an effort to make race pride more than an end in itself: to utilize it as a morale
builder, as the raw material of ‘racial solidarity.’”19 The personification of this effort led
to the development of the race man. Sociologist Elijah Anderson expanded upon this
definition in his essay “The Precarious Balance: Race Man or Sellout?” saying a race
man was “a particular kind of black leader who lived in a segregated society and felt
strongly responsible to the black race, especially in front of whites or outsiders to the
community. Often, he felt as though he carried the whole weight of the race on his
shoulders, and in public had the need to put matters of race first. Such a person was intent
on ‘advancing the race’ by working as a role model, both to uplift the ghetto community
and to disabuse the wider society of its often negative view of blacks.”20 Within this
definition it becomes clear that Howard Fuller’s identity as a race man is not only
accurate, but also helpful in understanding his approaches to advancing his race over
time.
The focus on race in this project, how being black shaped Howard Fuller, how
racism continuously oppressed those he set out to advance with his activism, and how
focusing on race would lead Fuller to build coalitions with people outside of his race

17
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while drawing criticism from individuals within it is explored through the lens of Critical
Race Theory. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, the editors of Critical Race Theory:
The Cutting Edge, and authors of Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, wrote that after
“the civil rights movement of the 1960s had stalled, and indeed that many of its gains
were being rolled back. New approaches were needed to understand and come to grips
with the more subtle, but just as deeply entrenched, varieties of racism that characterize
our times.”21 Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged out of this need, and became “a
collection of activists and scholars interested in studying and transforming the
relationship among race, racism, and power”22 and differs from traditional civil rights
“which embraces incrementalism and step-by-step progress.” CRT also seeks not only to
“understand our social situation, but to change it.”23 Two key tenets of Critical Race
Theory that are applicable to Howard Fuller’s life and activism are the ideas of “interest
convergence” and a necessary “critique of liberalism.”
According to Delgado and Stefancic, Derrick Bell was CRT’s “intellectual father
figure,” and the developer of the concept of interest convergence.24 Interest convergence
is the idea that “white elites will tolerate or encourage racial advances for blacks only
when such advances also promote white self-interest.”25 Derrick Bell applied this idea
directly to the Brown vs. Board of Education decision by drawing attention to the fact
that the NAACP had been fighting for school desegregation for years before the 1954
decision. He argued that the case was decided because “world and domestic
21

Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, ed., Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2000), xvi.
22
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New
York University Press, 2001), 2.
23
Ibid., 3.
24
Ibid., 5.
25
Delgado and Stefancic, ed., Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, xvii.
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considerations—not moral qualms over blacks’ plight”26 were crucial to garner the
support of countries that could potentially fall to communism. The United States, Bell
argued, needed to appear to be improving the lives of minorities in their own land if they
were going to gain the loyalty of non-whites around the world.27 Fuller would see
instances of interest convergence during his activism and would act on them to advance
his race, regardless of whom this led him to ally with.
Critical race theorists do not see liberalism as an adequate way to address racial
problems in America. Delgado and Stefancic describe liberalism as “a system of civil
rights litigation and activism characterized by incrementalism, faith in the legal system,
and hope for progress.”28 Howard Fuller also holds these critiques. The most compelling
part of this criticism is CRT’s criticism of rights. For these theorists, “Rights are almost
always procedural (for example, to a fair process) rather than substantive (for example, to
food, housing, or education)”29 and see them as inhibiting progress for minorities because
once rights are obtained, “the minority group is left little better than it was before, if not
worse. Its friends, the liberals, believing the problems has been solved, go on to
something else, such as saving the whales, while its adversaries, the conservatives,
furious that the Supreme Court has given way once again to undeserving minorities, set
up their resistance.”30 As Fuller’s activism took place after many rights for blacks were
established by legislation such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, this critique is important in exploring his approaches. While rights may have already
been won in court, the actual impact they were having on Fuller’s people was limited.
26

Delgado and Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 18-19.
Ibid., 19.
28
Delgado and Stefancic, ed., Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, 1.
29
Delgado and Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 23.
30
Ibid., 23-24.
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Fuller himself has criticized liberalism, which has led him to not identify directly with
any political party. This helps to solidify his identity as a race man, rather than anything
affiliating him with a political side.
This project has been divided into five chapters. Following this introduction,
Chapter 2 discusses Fuller’s life from birth through his work in Durham, North Carolina.
Fuller moved to Milwaukee in 1948 and by high school had emerged as a leader and
active member of the community. Fuller attended North Division High School when it
was transitioning from a predominantly white to a predominantly black institution and
went on to become the first black man to graduate from Carroll College, receiving a
bachelor’s degree in sociology in 1962.31 Fuller attended Western Reserve University
(now Case Western) and was greatly affected by the activist work he did in Cleveland
while attending school. This led him to take a position within the national War on
Poverty Program in Durham, North Carolina, after completing a Master’s degree in
Social Administration in 1964.32 In Durham, his support for integration shifted to a desire
for black-controlled black educational systems. From protesting housing discrimination,
to organizing workers, to opening his own all-black university, Fuller worked in Durham
until he exhausted himself and decided to move back to Milwaukee in 1976. Chapter 3
tells the story of Howard Fuller’s return to Wisconsin and the various jobs he held and
battles he fought to advance his race. This culminated in his appointment as
superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools in 1991. From fighting to create an all-black
school district, to expanding the availability of vouchers for education, Fuller’s

31

Howard Fuller, interview by Jonathan Coleman (transcript), June 27, 1991, in Jonathan
Coleman Papers 1976-1997, Manuscript Collection 152, Box 1, Tape 15, Golda Meir Library Archives,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
32
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appointment was a surprise to many, but his controversial ideas gained positive and
critical national attention for both Fuller and the Milwaukee Public School district.
Chapter 4 explores negative local reactions to Fuller, leading to his resignation as
superintendent but his rise as a national advocate for the expansion of school choice. This
chapter also discusses the school choice debate on a broader scale. Chapter 5 concludes
the analysis of Howard Fuller as a race man who has taken evolving approaches to
providing opportunities for low-income blacks in America, and explains where Howard
Fuller is today.
For this project, all known available texts written about Fuller and the Milwaukee
Public schools were sought out in order to explain his life and activism. Much has been
written about Milwaukee Public Schools that provides factual information and sheds
interpretive light on the system Howard Fuller would eventually work within and against.
As these histories are important sources of information, they will be referenced and cited
throughout this writing; this thesis does not, however, attempt to supersede their scholarly
interpretations. Jack Dougherty, in More Than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black
School Reform in Milwaukee,33 discusses educational reform movements in Milwaukee,
with special attention paid to their leaders, from World War I until the late 1980s. Bill
Dahlk, in Against the Wind: African Americans & the Schools in Milwaukee, 19632002,34 provides an impressive amount of factual information about MPS, from leaders
and policies to student make-up and funding. While Dahlk does not provide the kind of
narrative Dougherty does, the plethora of straightforward information is helpful in

33

Jack Dougherty, More Than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee,
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
34
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understanding MPS as a context that Howard Fuller operated within. James K. Nelsen
wrote his Master’s thesis on “Racial Integration and the Milwaukee Public Schools,
1963-2003,”35 which provides more helpful information on the racial climate of the
school system Fuller would come to lead. With a focus just on racial integration, Nelsen
provides accessible information about his topic without getting bogged down by a
complete history of MPS or its leaders. Jonathan Coleman wrote Long Way to Go: Black
and White in America 36 to examine racism in America with Milwaukee as its focus.
Although Coleman does not focus on education, the racial component within educational
politics and both criticisms and praise of Howard Fuller as a black leader are explored
and useful to this project.
While these works focused on important aspects of Milwaukee or education that
Howard Fuller was involved in, none focused exclusively on Howard Fuller and his life
story. For this project, the archival copies of interviews authors Coleman and Dougherty
conducted were used extensively to explain Fuller with his own voice. Jonathan Coleman
also recorded some of Fuller’s speeches and meetings, providing a unique insight into his
life.37 In 1991, Fuller started teaching a class on Saturday mornings called the
Commando Project. Most of the students were black Muslims from the North side of
Milwaukee. According to Fuller, the purpose of these classes was “to get people to
understand the trends in the development of African-American history.”38 Transcripts
from these meetings are analyzed here when discussing Fuller’s time in college,
35

James K. Nelsen, “Racial Integration in the Milwaukee Public Schools, 1963-2003,” (Master’s
thesis, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2003).
36
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Cleveland, Durham, and as Milwaukee Public School’s superintendent. Jack Dougherty’s
archival collection on Fuller includes newspaper articles, interview transcripts of Fuller
from other journalists, and other writers’ features on Fuller.39 These, along with
newspaper articles from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and one of Milwaukee’s black
newspapers, The Milwaukee Courier, are also used to explain his life. Fuller’s own
writings are also used to tell his story through his own voice. Scholarly articles Fuller has
written, as well as his dissertation from Marquette University have helped to explain his
opinion and philosophy behind school reform, primarily in Milwaukee, and are used to
show his continuing activism. It is important to note that information regarding Fuller’s
time in Madison, working as Secretary of the Department of Employee Relations from
1984-1986, was not available for this thesis. Who Fuller worked with and the political
and business partnerships he cultivated during this time are unknown, begging the
question of how this time affected his evolving stance on schools choice. Beyond that
gap, this thesis synthesizes the secondary sources on Milwaukee and MPS as well as the
primary sources written about and by Fuller to establish a new perspective on Fuller by
shedding light on his activism and life.
Howard Fuller went from fighting for school integration in Cleveland in the
1970s, to pushing to create an all-black school system in Milwaukee in the 1980s, to
vehemently promoting school choice, the provision of public funding for private
education, in the 1990s. It is difficult to understand these shifts, and process how one man
can seemingly change his approaches to reform so drastically. This thesis aims to make
sense of him in a time and place of problematic history, and show that through evolving

39
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approaches, Fuller continually tried to advance his race and has used his status as a
successful black man to do so. This solidifies him a race man. In analyzing decades of
Howard Fuller’s civil rights activism and attempting to understand his changing stances,
this project will help to dismantle the dominant linear narrative historians have
commonly used regarding the Civil Rights movement. Fuller’s story shows that his
evolving approaches are responses to specific contexts that created the need for refined
ideologies in order to achieve his goal. In that respect, Howard Fuller embodies the
strategy of the northern civil rights movement as a whole: using a variety of approaches
in response to the changing political, cultural and activist climate over time implemented
to empower blacks and achieve racial equality. All of theses resources are used to tell a
comprehensive important story about Fuller and his life’s work.

15
CHAPTER TWO
POWER CONCEDES NOTHING WITHOUT DEMAND
Howard Fuller’s early life laid the foundation for the inspired leader he would
become. This chapter will discuss Fuller’s life from birth in Shreveport, to growing up in
Milwaukee, to higher education in Cleveland, to early jobs in Durham, and argue that
those formative years played a crucial role in developing Fuller’s belief that he had a
responsibility to uplifting his race. Being a part of the Second Great Migration, Fuller
experienced a northern city as it transformed from a predominantly white to a racially
mixed population. The segregated community he grew up in helped shape his idea of
what children can expect from their neighborhoods, provided successful black role
models he looked up to, and reinforced the importance of education. This chapter will
show the beginnings of Howard Fuller the leader, from his all-black high school to his
all-white college, and his philosophical evolution from non-violence to direct action. It
will argue that Fuller’s youth allowed him to experiment with many different ideas on
how to advance his race, allowing him (in his later years of activism) to reject those
approaches that had not worked while utilizing those that had.
Howard Fuller was an only child born to Tom and Juanita Fuller on January 14,
1941 in Shreveport, Louisiana. When Fuller was two years old, his parents divorced and
his mother moved to Milwaukee in order to explore employment opportunities.40 Howard
Fuller lived with his grandmother in Shreveport until he too moved to Milwaukee to be

40
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with his mother and stepfather at seven years old.41 The population of blacks in
Milwaukee in 1945 was 10,200, 1.6 percent of the total population.42 Joe William Trotter
Jr., a historian from Carnegie-Mellon University reported that during this time, “AfroAmericans increasingly filled the areas between Wright and Walnut streets on the north
and 8th and 12th streets to the west, although State and Third streets, respectively,
remained the southern and eastern boundaries.” Trotter continued, “Nearly 97 percent of
the Afro-American population resided in blocks comprising the northern Near Downtown
district.”43 This isolation of blacks in Milwaukee “resulted from several interrelated
factors in addition to depressed economic status: municipal zoning ordinances, restrictive
housing covenants, discriminatory federal housing polices, housing competition between
blacks and working-class whites, and the internal social dynamics of the AfricanAmerican community.”44 While these restrictions relegated blacks in Milwaukee to the
worst, most undesired housing, according to historian Jonathan Coleman the sharply
divided racial community had its advantages. “The black community as a whole was
small and tight-knit back in the late forties and fifties, and saw its responsibility as a
collective one, especially to each other’s children.”45 Fuller also lived in “a community
where people went off to work, all sorts of people—from the factory workers who
punched in at A.O. Smith and American Motors to teachers and clergymen to doctors and
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lawyers in fine suits with snappy briefcases.”46 Coleman argued, “If there were any
pluses to segregation, this was perhaps the biggest one—because everybody, regardless
of income, more or less lived within close proximity of everybody else, there was a sense
of unity, of being part of a larger family a feeling that if a doctor lived next door to you,
what was to prevent you from becoming a doctor too?”47
Housing shortages in Milwaukee were a result of the influx of black and white
war workers moving to industrial cities during the late 1930s and early 1940s and were
compounded by the return of veterans from overseas at World War II’s end. While the
issue of public housing was debated on both the city and state level, the housing crisis for
black Milwaukeeans could not be denied. According to historian Phyllis M. Santacroce,
At the end of the war the issue of housing for black Milwaukeeans finally
began to move into political discourse. A 1944 report on housing
conditions in the Sixth Ward, home to Milwaukee’s growing black
population, noted that the area was blighted and suffered from higher than
normal mortality rates and incredible poverty. The report called for the
newly created MHA [Milwaukee Housing Authority] to build a project in
the area and for the city to enforce ordinances relating to property
standards… One of the first tasks of the newly created MHA was to
request federal money to build approximately 140 war housing units for
Blacks in the Sixth Ward. Before the Sixth Ward project received final
approval the war came to an end, requiring conversion of the project from
war worker housing to low-income housing.48
Through the end of the war and into the 1950s, the black population continued to rise in
Milwaukee. Milwaukee’s socialist mayor, Frank Zeidler’s, “first and most immediate
goal was the building of public housing.”49 His efforts resulted in the building of Hillside
Terrace, where Fuller resided throughout his childhood. Fuller’s community as a boy
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provided successful role models for children in the area: people who proved that if they
tried hard enough, they could be anything they wanted to be. Fuller’s status as a lowincome resident of Hillside would not change that because, “though they didn’t have
much money, they never thought of themselves as poor, and it never occurred to Fuller
that he wouldn’t make it, that he wouldn’t be able to achieve anything he set out to
achieve.”50
Fuller’s mother enrolled him in the St. Boniface Catholic parochial school,
making him the only black student in his third-grade class.51 He was an active boy in his
community, “involved in boys’ clubs and neighborhood centers and went to church every
Sunday, where he was an altar boy.”52 On Saturdays while shopping with his mother, she
would drive by the child detention center as a warning to him of where he could end up if
he “did not behave himself.”53 This resonated with Fuller as he started high school.
According to journalist Kevin Merida, most black students in Milwaukee in the 1950s
attended either Lincoln or North Division High School.54 Fuller attended the latter from
1954-1958, during the time when North Division transitioned from a predominantly
white to a predominantly black school.55 At North Division, Fuller started a trend of
leading “the student body of every school he attended.”56 Fuller was also a leader on the
basketball court. In his senior year at North Division, Fuller was selected as both an AllCity and All-State player and led the Blue Devils basketball team to an undefeated 15-0
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season.57 Fuller used his basketball skills to gain the opportunity of paying for college.
Although Marquette University and the University of New Mexico offered him
basketball scholarships, Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin offered him a
Trailblazer scholarship. This meant that even if Fuller became injured or unable to play
basketball, he would still be offered an education based on academic merit. As Fuller put
it, “it was secure.”58
Fuller’s time at Carroll College was an adjustment from his time at North
Division. Transitioning from an all-black to an all-white world pushed him to succeed
and become comfortable in situations he had never before been in. While reflecting on
his time at Carroll, Fuller told a Saturday morning class he began teaching nearly four
decades later about the experience:
When my mother dropped me off at age 17, I went by myself to Carroll
College. What happens is you get caught in between two worlds. In simple
terms, you are out there and I was out there and people would say why do
you have a mustache? I was trying to figure out how I was going to
survive out there, and then you come home and people are doing new
dances and you just in between two worlds and not in either one. It was a
bittersweet experience in the sense that during your college years, that is a
time of social life, and stuff like that. I didn’t have no social life… No
matter what anybody tells you, you do take on some of the characteristics
of that place to survive… like it or not, you take on some of those
characteristics. It doesn’t mean that you take on all of them, but you take
on some. You always got that.”59
Navigating these two worlds would become a consistent part of Fuller’s life and career.
His experience at Carroll College was a positive one, with his team supporting him on
and off the court. Fuller joined a white fraternity that some of his teammates were a part
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of, and while at a tournament in Southern Illinois when Fuller was denied service at a
restaurant, the entire team walked out in solidarity.60 In 1962, Fuller graduated from
Carroll College with a bachelor’s degree in Sociology. 61
Fuller saw himself as a pioneer when he began attending Carroll College in
1958.62 While Fuller experienced success in the nearly all-white world, he felt as though
he was losing some of his blackness. This led him to Cleveland, Ohio, seeking a Master’s
degree in Social Administration from Western Reserve University. Fuller told historian
Jack Dougherty that after being “caught in-between two worlds” in Cleveland, it “took
me a long time to regain my sense of myself as a black person… Cleveland was a bridge
to that. North Carolina solidified it.”63 Fuller told his Saturday morning students years
later about the growing discomfort he felt with whites at Carroll College seeing him as an
exceptional black man simply because he was successful:
I know this from my own experience, is that you go out somewhere… like
I did at Carroll, and they find out you can speak English and you can
write. For some white people this is a revelation. So then what happens is
they start talking about you as special, a special Negro. All the rest of
them are still like they are, but you, you’re special, so we’re going to
create a separate category for you that distinguishes you from the rest of
them. What would you call that? The interesting thing about racism is, you
can have a person who is racist and still think they are being kind to you.
But even the essence of their kindness is a reflection of racism.64
While attending school in Cleveland, Fuller became involved in the city’s school
integration movement. After the Supreme Court had decided in 1954 that, “separate
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educational facilities are inherently unequal,”65 primarily black parents and other
community members across the country sought to integrate their public schools. Fuller
would help lead this fight in Cleveland.
Inequality in public school systems was rampant in the United States in the
twentieth century as well as efforts to reduce those inequalities. According to historian
Thomas J. Sugrue, “Parent-led school boycotts grew from a deep taproot: the desire for
equal education and the frustration at the persistence of separate, unequal schools.”66 He
continued, “Blacks who migrated northward held high expectations about education…
They saw education as a ticket out of poverty, but their hopes were often dashed when
they confronted the racial barriers to equal education above the Mason-Dixon Line.”67
While opinions on how to address the problem of unequal education varied at the time
between integration and better separate schools, “For most black parents in the postwar
years…the arguments for and against segregated schools were too abstract. Parents of
school-children had to make decisions about their children’s education in the short run,
and they would take better education in whatever form it came. That said, between the
1940s and the 1960s, the lion’s share of civil right activists—from intellectuals to
national civil rights organizers to grassroots protestors—demanded an end to separate
schools.”68 This national trend would influence Howard Fuller’s introduction to civil
rights activism.

65

Quoted in Sonya Douglass Horsford, Learning in a Burning House: Educational Inequality
Ideology, and (Dis)Integration (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011), 15.
66
Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North
(New York: Random House, 2009), 170.
67
Ibid., 171
68
Ibid., 173.

22
In Cleveland, as president of the student senate of the school of social work at
Western Reserve University, Fuller was responsible for organizing students to attend
peaceful protests.69 According to journalist Kevin Merida, “Fuller and others peacefully
had opposed the building of a new public school in a predominantly black portion of the
Glenville area of the city on the grounds that it surely would be segregated. In 1964, the
theme of civil rights protest was integration.”70 When asked what his and other
protesters’ goal was in Cleveland during this time, Fuller explained, “Well, I think it was
much more of, to the degree that I understood it, integration, in the sense that I was
fighting to say we had to integrate the schools. I had not yet reached the point of
nationalism… So I was very clear. To the extend that I had any clarity, that we were
fighting for integration, to make sure that black kids were able to attend schools with
white kids, and that they were not going to be segregated within the schools that they
were attending.”71 On April 7, 1964, after being arrested and released for participating in
a sit-in at the school board, Fuller went to the site of the new school to join the
demonstration and try to block the construction. Bruce Klunder, a white Presbyterian
minister and a founding member of Cleveland’s CORE chapter since 1962 organized and
led the protest to stop construction for the Stephen E. Howe Elementary School. Fuller
and three other activists laid in front of the bulldozer, blocking its path, while Klunder lay
behind. “The operator, seeking to avoid the protestors in front of him, unknowingly
backed over Klunder, killing him instantly.”72 According to Fuller, watching an innocent
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man lose his life in the midst of an intergenerational peaceful protest “was the end of my
non-violent career… I mean non-violence as a philosophy.”73
This change would be reinforced by Fuller’s first exposure to Malcolm X in
Cleveland that same year. Malcolm X was a prominent member of the Nation of Islam,
rising to fame through public speeches and presentations exposing the injustices black
Americans were facing at the hands of whites. After leaving the Nation of Islam in 1964,
Malcolm continued speaking and fighting for the liberation of black Americans. On
February 14, 1965, Malcolm spoke in Detroit, Michigan. The ideas espoused during this
speech show two philosophies of Malcolm X that would greatly influence Howard Fuller.
The first was Malcolm’s connection of black Americans to their homeland:
First you have to realize that up until 1959 Africa was dominated by the
colonial powers. And by the colonial powers of Europe having complete
control over Africa, they projected the image of Africa negatively. They
projected Africa always in a negative light: jungles, savages, cannibals,
nothing civilized. Why then naturally it was so negative [that] it was
negative to you and me, and you and I began to hate it. We didn't want
anybody telling us anything about Africa, much less calling us Africans.
In hating Africa and in hating the Africans, we ended up hating ourselves,
without even realizing it. Because you can't hate the roots of a tree and not
hate the tree. You can't hate your origin and not end up hating yourself.
You can't hate Africa and not hate yourself.74
The second was Malcolm’s philosophy on non-violence.
We get tricked into being nonviolent, and when somebody stands up and
talks like I just did, they say, "Why, he's advocating violence!" Isn't that
what they say? Every time you pick up your newspaper, you see where
one of these things has written into it that I'm advocating violence. I have
never advocated any violence. I've only said that Black people who are the
victims of organized violence perpetrated upon us by the Klan, the
Citizens' Council, and many other forms, we should defend ourselves. And
when I say that we should defend ourselves against the violence of others,
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they use their press skillfully to make the world think that I'm calling on
violence, period. I wouldn't call on anybody to be violent without a cause.
But I think the Black man in this country, above and beyond people all
over the world, will be more justified when he stands up and starts to
protect himself, no matter how many necks he has to break and heads he
has to crack.75
According to Fuller, Malcolm X “scared him to death,” as he had been conditioned to
“reject the views of Malcolm, who was portrayed as a raging madman preaching
violence.” Fuller told the Milwaukee County Journal, one of the city’s black newspapers,
that, “I saw myself as an integrationist and Malcolm was teaching separation. I was for
non-violence and allegedly Malcolm was teaching violence. I was for supporting the
philosophies of supporting Dr. King—calling for ‘loving the enemy’—Malcolm was
preaching the philosophy that called for tick for tack (sic).”76 After Fuller’s experience
with the devastating effects of non-violent protest in Cleveland, for him Malcolm X and
his philosophies were becoming less frightening and more fascinating.
After completing his Master’s degree in Cleveland, Fuller moved to Chicago “to
work as a job development specialist for the Urban League. After 11 months there,
youthful impatience and a desire to do what he was trained to do prompted Fuller to take
a job as the director of community development with Operation Breakthrough (a local
office of the Office of Economic Opportunity) in Durham, North Carolina.”77 This
program was part of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, an effort in the 1960s to use the
federal government’s influence to reduce poverty for Americans. In a speech at the
University of Michigan in May of 1964, Johnson asked, “Will you join in the battle to
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give every citizen an escape from the crushing weight of poverty?” and told students,
“The challenge of the next half century is whether we have the wisdom to use [our]
wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American
civilization.”78 According to Thomas Sugrue, “By and large, War on Poverty programs
embodied the conventional wisdom of mainstream economists and social welfare
advocates, and focused on behavioral modification as the solution to poverty.”79 It was
through the War on Poverty that the Office of Economic Opportunity funded programs
such as Operation Breakthrough across the country. It was here that Howard Fuller would
continue to grow as an activist and leader, recognize his own limitations, and reinforce
the importance of responsibility to help uplift those in his community, and other
communities of the oppressed.
Fuller’s work in Durham initially involved fighting for housing rights for lowincome blacks in the city. According to journalist Tom Bamberger, it was in Durham that
Fuller accepted late nineteenth-century black abolitionist, author, and statesman
Frederick Douglas’ philosophy that “If there is no struggle, there is no progress…
because power concedes nothing without a demand.”80 Through Operation Breakthrough,
“Fuller directed anti-poverty and community development programs. He helped black
high school students protest school policy.”81 Fuller’s work in Durham coincided with the
development and expansion of the Black Power Movement. According to author A.P
McDonald Jr., “‘Black Power’ refers to the black man’s power of control over himself,
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not (as some believe) his control over the white man—especially not in the sense of
physical force. The Black Power movement (teaching Blacks that they do have some
control over their destinies) is one of the most important social events of recent history,
and is crucial to the upgrading of black men everywhere.”82 As to the development of
Black Power, historian Komozi Woodard wrote, “The Black Power organizations were
fashioned in the aftermath of the urban uprisings that supplied hundreds of new activists
to populate the new organizations. The fusion between those leaders, organizations, and
the intense consciousness of racial oppression became incredibly powerful in the context
of the black urban uprisings of the 1960s.”83 The Newark Rebellion that took place in
July of 1967 began because of frustrations in Newark with “housing, education,
unemployment and police brutality. Similar to the problems in Chicago and Detroit,
Newark’s housing crisis was heated by decades of segregated housing and brought to the
boiling point by urban renewal policies aimed at the removal of the ghetto population.”84
These uprisings caused tensions in urban areas across the country. Cities were concerned
of falling to similar fates, and outspoken activists such as Fuller did not ease these
concerns.
Less than a week after the Newark Rebellion, Fuller spoke to Durham’s city
council about the plight of low-income blacks in the Southern city, warning, “And you all
better start doin’ something to benefit these people cause they’re tired and frustrated, and
people who get tired and frustrated do things they wouldn’t ordinarily do.”85 Although
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Fuller had only organized peaceful protests during his time in Durham, “The next
morning, huge headlines blazed across the front page of the Durham Morning Herald:
‘ANOTHER ‘NEWARK’ THREATENED HERE.”86 Fuller, aware of his perceived
threat to whites in Durham, told a group of black college students that same year that, “I
have never gone anywhere to start a riot, but you should know I’ve turned the last cheek.
The next time I turn a cheek, I’ll follow it with a right cross.”87
While Fuller’s profession of violent tactics may have scared some, “despite his
outspokenness, Fuller was always impressed by authority and accomplishment, and
maintained his mentor relationship with powerful upper-middle class blacks.”88 It was
one of these relationships, with John Wheeler (chief executive of a “large North Carolina
financial institution”), that taught Fuller a valuable lesson he would use for the rest of his
life. According to Fuller, Wheeler “never raised his voice,” and,
was probably one of the most powerful black people in the country. He
had pictures of him and Lyndon Johnson in his office. And the one thing I
learned from Mr. Wheeler is you can go into the halls of “power” and still
maintain your sense of rage but you can do it in such a way that you stand
some chance of coming out with what you went in there to get.”89
Fuller would apply this strategy to many of his future battles, making some people think
of him as an “Uncle Tom.” For Fuller, it was yet another way to get things accomplished.
While Fuller’s philosophies continued to move to the radical left, he began to embrace
the idea of Black Power. “Take the word ‘power’ and put black in front if it… All it
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means is that black people got to have power to make decisions about their own lives…
Powerlessness breeds a race of beggars.”90
Fuller was putting the pieces of discrimination in housing, education, and
employment together and becoming more aware that blacks were being strategically
disempowered. In an interview given in North Carolina after three years of activism
there, Fuller concluded,
All our lives they’ve been stepping on us and we’ve been saying thank
you sir and turning the other cheek. Dr. King’s movement that I went
through, that bit about singing we shall overcome and being hit up side the
head, I think that if anything of value was brought out it was the sense of
being a man to a great number of black men. A feeling that didn’t exist
before… basic to human beings as far as manhood is the ability to protect
oneself and one’s family, to make possible a meaningful kind of life and a
meaningful existence. Up until this point this has not been possible for
black people. The black man has had to live with the idea that he neither
could protect himself nor his family nor could he provide for his family
any kind of significant existence as a human being.91
When asked if the marches or civil rights demonstrations were assertive enough Fuller
replied,
No. It maybe helped me and others. We got jobs. But for the great masses
of black people it hasn’t helped anything significantly or changed their
lives. So this is why we’re in the period we’re in now because the
problems that we’re talkin' about are a lot deeper than being able to come
to Harry’s to get a cup of coffee and sit and talk to you. The problems are
much deeper than that. You can always hope to be President. But the black
man doesn’t live with any kind of expectation like that… The absence of a
present, future, and past.92
In reexamining the white power structure, Fuller also reevaluated his position on
integration and Brown decision itself. After becoming a part-time lecturer at the
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and experiencing racial tension there, he saw
“two flaws” in the “strain of liberalism that emanated” from the Supreme Court decision
made nearly a decade earlier, “First, it assumed the system was essentially just and that
blacks find their remedies within it; secondly, Brown at least implied that if separate was
unequal, then there could not be excellent black institutions.”93 According to Tom
Bamberger, Fuller’s response to the first flaw “was to ‘…reject American society as it
is.’… Addressing the second flaw, Fuller started his own all-black Malcolm X Liberation
University.”94 When asked in February of 1968 why he resigned from his teaching
position at Chapel Hill, Fuller explained, “Two reasons. One is that I have been saying all
the time that black people have to begin putting all their efforts in improving the black
community, that they have to bring all their talent and skills to the black community and
here I am at UNC. To me there were inconsistencies and I don’t like to be inconsistent in
my beliefs and my practices. So I quit. Now I can go and teach black students which I
plan to do in March and the other reason was because I didn’t have time. I’m going to
make time to teach in a black college.”95 Fuller’s desire to leave UNC, however, did not
mean he was not willing to work with whites in order to achieve his educational goals.
Fuller told journalist Robert Brown,
We are after change. Anybody that can help us bring about change, I want
to talk to. But they have to understand that if they are white their
participation has to be based on our desires as we see it. As we call the
shots. We don’t need to be friends. We don’t have to walk around together
and all that stuff. We are talking about practical matters. You see, there’s
fervor and then there are things that are practical and at some point you
have to sit down and be paactical [sic]. At this particular point we are just
working on the black community. We must consolidate and unify that
black community. We don’t have a whole lot of time to make sure that all
93
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of our feelings are kept with our white friends. They are just going to have
to bear with us. Those who are real and understand that this is a problem
we have right now, to develop ourselves, to consolidate and unify
ourselves. That’s the way it is.96
In the spring of 1969, black students at Duke University, “went through the
procedures of trying to acquire relevant education at existing schools,”97 a black studies
program. According to Dr. Tyrone C. Howard, “During the 1960s, the Black-studies
movement was initiated by Black college students who were advocates for the inclusion
of the life and history of African Americans to be incorporated into the
curriculum…These calls were preceded by the early Black ethnic-studies movement of
the first part of the century that sought to create accurate images of African Americans’
life and history and to contribute to the establishment of African Americans’
institutions.”98 At Duke, after negotiations about the program started, students, according
to Fuller, discovered that “they (the administration) weren’t ready to give control to the
Black students. They weren’t ready to let Black students design the program the way they
really wanted it.”99 The students protested, and “seized Duke University’s administration
building… and tacked up a banner saying ‘Malcolm X Liberation University.’ Though
riot police and tear gas brought the banner down, the school was born.”100 Fuller wanted
the curriculum at Malcolm X Liberation University (MXLU) to be taught with a black
focus. This idea “began innocently, says Fuller, by ‘taking any subject and putting ‘black’
in front of it. Black history had to be taught, for example, because it was not being passed
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down within the conventional institutional framework. Inevitably, this led to the need for
a historical understanding of the African race, when combined with the knowledge of
imperialism exposed by the anti-war movement led the university to a political movement
called Pan-Africanism (a global extension of Black Power).”101
While early twentieth century Pan-Africanism focused on African nations’ right
to independence and a freedom from oppression, Pan-Africanism eventually became
“African nationalism projected on the continental level and strengthened by the support
of Afro-Americans in the New World.”102 In the Journal of Contemporary History,
Immanuel Geiss provided a historical account of Pan-Africanism, arguing that the
colonization that happened in Africa and the West Indies mirrored the situation blacks
were living in in the United States, “a quasi-colonial situation whether as slaves or
formally emancipated but effectively segregated and discriminated against.”103 This is the
world Howard Fuller lived in. He had seen blacks in the United States be systematically
discriminated against and oppressed, as was happening to blacks everywhere. Geiss
wrote about this experience, saying “Rejected by white society as unequals, they [black
Americans] were inevitably thrown back on their African background and sought to
improve their own status via developing Africa, which they were the first to conceive as a
single unit, though often with romanticizing overtones.”104 Fuller could see a connection
between the oppression and struggles African nations were having gaining independence,
and the struggles and oppression black Americans were experiencing. Although winning
rights on paper, Fuller saw his people living without equal opportunity in housing,
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education, and employment. This pushed him to open Malcolm X Liberation University
with a Pan-African ideology.
One of Milwaukee’s black newspapers, The Milwaukee Courier, ran an article a
few weeks before Malcolm X Liberation University (MXLU) was set to open, describing
its approach to education:
Although one might say that the igniting point for the founding of the
school was the typical growing frustration with the traditional American
systems, the true strength of the institution lies in that it has accepted this
inability as fact and gone on from there, thus structuring itself on its own
terms rather than as patchwork on an external skeleton.105
Howard Fuller, who “had experience in trying to integrate black people” into dominant
white systems, had come to the conclusion that such inclusion was “highly unlikely in
America… ‘Once you really get involved in community organization, where you’re
trying to organize Black people to deal with this man’s system,’ said Fuller, ‘the first
think you become aware of is that you really can’t deal with it, and that there’s no sense
in trying to get incorporated into it.’”106 His school’s philosophy mirrored the philosophy
of one Black Power activist at the time and Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee president, Stokely Carmichael. “Of Carmichael, Fuller explained, ‘He sees
that there’s no real sense in Black people talking about getting rid of oppression in this
country unless we’re ready to deal with the fact that we’ve got to have an independent
African continent as a liberated zone from which to really operate and bring about our
own concept of eliminating oppression and our whole relationship to the African
nation.’”107 Because of the deep connection between the liberation of African countries
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and the liberation of African Americans, travel to Africa would be a crucial part of
MXLU’s curriculum.
Fuller traveled to Africa in August of 1971, “where he met with black African
leaders and ended up, quite unexpectedly, traveling in the bush for about a month with
black freedom fighters in Mozambique.”108 Although the group was bombed once while
Fuller was traveling amongst them, very little else occurred during his time there. This
gave Fuller a lot of time to walk and think in the homeland he had spoken about at length,
and allowed him to “come to terms with what he saw there. One of the most impressive
sights, he felt, was the literal empowerment of his people: ‘[A] sister standing in
traditional African dress with an AK-47 automatic rifle draped over her shoulder,’ wrote
Fuller in his diary, made him feel ‘proud to see our people at that level of struggle. Now I
am here in the midst of it. No speeches, no rallies, no newspaper articles, no press
conferences, just armed struggle against the enemy.’”109 This was difficult for Fuller to
comprehend, however, because here, the enemy was also black. “As soon as I got to
Africa, it became clear to me that the… race thing didn’t explain the problem because
you saw black people under the control of black people, but there was still oppression.”110
The oppression Fuller saw was instead based on class, the basis of another philosophical
movement gaining popularity: Marxism.
Marxism, named after its intellectual father figure Karl Marx, was a philosophy
born from the observation of the relationship between the ruling and ruled classes
developed in the mid-nineteenth century. According to historian Eugene Kamenka,
Marxism was the belief that,
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The introduction of tools, the division of labour, and the rise of private
property divide men into social classes, primarily into the class of
exploiters, who own and administer the means of production, and the class
or classes of the exploited, who actually work and produce… slave owners
give way to feudal landlords and feudal landlords give way to the
bourgeoisie. The state that pretends to represent the general social interest
is in fact representing a sectional interest, safe-guarding the social and
political conditions congenial to the ruling class.111
Fuller’s experience in Africa mirrored this trend, forcing him to question the relevance of
class rather than race in Durham.
Fuller’s philosophical switch from Pan-Africanism in the late 1960s to the classbased philosophy of Marxism in the early 1970s would change his activist work. He later
reflected on that time in his life, “My mistake in that period was flip-flopping.”112 For the
first part of his adult life Fuller had seen problems for his people all through the lens of
racism. After Mozambique, he thought it was all a matter of class struggle. It was not
until years later he realized “for black people in America, it’s both. That’s something that
I’m still grappling with. At different times I take up issues and struggles because I see
them as important for the immediate survival of black people. But if you were to ask me,
‘Do I think that these things are going to bring about fundamental change in the system?’
My answer would have to be no… When I was younger everything was absolutely clear
to me. But as I’ve studied more… I don’t have as clear a perspective on the nature of the
alternative.’”113
Malcolm X Liberation University closed its doors in 1973 after four years in
operation. According to Tom Bamberger, “The school had been divided by two political
factions: the Pan Africanists, who believed their struggle should continue internationally
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in Africa, and the Nationalists, who identified with America. Fuller chose America.”114
The Milwaukee Courier reported that at MXLU,
Since October 25, 1969, an estimated 125 students had attended the school
which had a curriculum aimed at equipping persons with the ideological
and technical skills necessary to aid directly in the development of the
African continent. They taught the students in 4 skill areas:
communications, engineering, biomedics, and agriculture. It originated in
renovated warehouses in the heart of Durham’s poverty-ridden black belt,
but had moved operations to Greensboro, about 50 miles away, in October
1970. It survived for three years on less than half a million dollars in
grants and contributed materials. Fuller, with the closing, stated “We just
see that the major contribution we can make to the freedom of all African
people is to wage struggle inside this country.”115
After the university shut its doors, Fuller took a job “as a business agent for the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,” and “singlehandedly began to
organize hospital workers at Duke University.”116
Fuller’s time in North Carolina reinforced his dedication to his cause, but exposed
how difficult facilitating change and bringing together parts of the black community
could be. From his work with Duke students, to founding Malcolm X Liberation
University, to fighting for worker’s rights, Fuller’s commitment to his activism was
beginning to catch up with him. In the summer of 1976, Fuller was involved with the
Revolutionary Workers League, “a group of theoretical extremists” that Fuller had
brought many of his friends into. The RWL held a two-day meeting in New Jersey that
was meant to be a “purge of impurities,” where “friends of Fuller’s were humiliated,
mentally tortured and physically beaten by other members of the group.” Fuller felt
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“responsible for this debacle,” and realized he had become active in a group that had
nothing to do with his “humanistic values and commitment to practical ways of making
people’s lives better.”117 When Fuller returned to North Carolina, he broke down. A
coworker described, “All of a sudden, it was there—I’m sitting and talking with a man
that can’t complete a sentence. He looked like he aged overnight. He was bent over,
couldn’t walk and couldn’t talk… We were shocked that someone could be brought down
so far.”118 Recognizing he was not being an effective facilitator of change any longer,
Fuller returned to Milwaukee ready for a vacation from trying to change the world.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH
When Howard Fuller returned to Milwaukee, he was coming back to a city that
was very different than the one he left he nearly twenty years before. As the black
population had been continuously increasing, their isolation created overcrowded housing
and schools. According to historian Patrick D. Jones,
Between 1890 and 1915, the growth of Milwaukee’s black community
coincided with increasing racial concentration…For the first time, through
a mixture of choice, economic necessity, restrictive housing covenants,
discriminatory real estate and loan practices, and overt racism, an
identifiable thirty-five block “black district”, refereed to variously as
“Little Africa” “Bronzeville,” or, later, “the inner core,” emerged on the
near North Side, an area also knows for its brothels, liquor joints, and
gambling dens. By 1940, the inner core had expanded to a seventy-five
block area and housed more than 90 percent of Milwaukee’s black
population.119
As the black population “grew over 700 percent in twenty-five years, rising from less
than 2 percent of the population in 1945 to nearly 15 percent in 1970,” Jones continued,
“The impact of this rise in population on the inner core was equally striking, intensifying
racial segregation and fueling the deterioration of housing, health, and urban
education.”120 Exhausted and broken, Fuller took time adjusting to this new Milwaukee
before getting back into the fight to provide quality education for low-income blacks.
While his drive as a race man remained, Fuller needed to understand his surroundings
and adjust to Milwaukee before he could positively affect its black community.
This chapter will explore Howard Fuller’s return to Milwaukee through his rise
to the superintendence of the Milwaukee Public Schools. Discussing the black political
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spectrum in Milwaukee at the time, this chapter will argue that there has never been a
consensus among blacks in Milwaukee on how to best provide quality education to
Milwaukee Public School students. Howard Fuller’s commitment to his race never meant
that he had their unanimous support, complicating his work and limiting his ability to
facilitate change. As a race man Fuller never wavered in doing what he hoped would
liberate his people and provide them a chance of success, even if other blacks disagreed.
Fuller had made it as a black man who grew up in Milwaukee, but did not take that
opportunity to advance himself only. Instead, he felt a responsibility to use his organizing
capabilities, leadership qualities, and middle-class status to try and open up the same
opportunities that had been available to him to the next generation of Milwaukee blacks.
It is crucial to understand the city and educational system Fuller was returning to
in order to understand his eventual activism. The redistribution of population after World
War II dramatically changed the racial and economic makeup of people within the
Milwaukee metropolitan area. As suburbs became increasingly white, residential
segregation forced black Milwaukeeans to stay within the city limits. These changes
fueled the integrationist fight in Milwaukee by Lloyd Barbee, president of the Wisconsin
NAACP in the early 1960s. The long battle Barbee fought led to an increased desire for
community control of black schools, a movement Howard Fuller would lead.
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the Brown v. Board of Education case,
declaring that separate school accommodations were inherently unequal, legally
overturning segregation in public schools. In the South, schools and institutions were
forced to implement vast changes in order to comply with the new law. Operating under
Jim Crow laws, southern states experienced de jure segregation, a separation of the
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population based on race implemented and supported by law. Northern cities and states,
however, practiced de facto segregation, where the population was separated by race due
to housing patterns and a reliance on neighborhood school systems. Housing patterns
became segregated as whites took advantage of opportunities to move out of the cities,
opportunities that were denied to blacks. Those whites that remained in the city fought to
keep their neighborhoods from integrating. Because the Brown decision only applied to
those school systems segregated by law, Northern activists took it upon themselves to
show the schools in these cities were in fact in violation of Brown based on their intense,
deliberate separation of students by race. According to historian James K. Nelsen, “if
change was to come, it would have to begin at the local level—the domain under which
schools traditionally fell. Whether it was Topeka, Little Rock, Montgomery,
Birmingham, or elsewhere, integration came from a combination of civil disobedience
followed by legal action. These then became the twin tasks of civil rights advocates in
cities such as… Milwaukee—to mobilize community support in acts of protest and to
mount a legal challenge to de facto segregation.”121
Attorney Lloyd Barbee was a staunch supporter of integration and felt anything
short of a totally integrated school system was unacceptable. In 1963, at a speech to the
Milwaukee Junior Bar Association, “Barbee launched Milwaukee’s first sustained public
challenge to segregated schools. ‘If the Brown decision means anything,’ he called out to
his audience, ‘it means that school segregation is unconstitutional wherever it exists,
north or south.’” 122 According to Jack Dougherty, Barbee claimed that “Milwaukee
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public schools were in violation of the Supreme Court ruling that segregation was
inherently unequal, citing as proof the rising number of predominantly black schools and
the long-standing practice of assigning the vast majority of black teachers to work in
them.” 123 At this meeting Barbee made a “public declaration of Milwaukee’s school
integration campaign” 124 and would combine on-the-ground activism and the legal
system to achieve that goal.
Discrimination in school-transfer policies, intact busing, and the hiring and
placing of teachers were some of the issues Barbee claimed were creating inequality in
MPS. According to Bill Dahlk, “The primary charge of reformers who wanted the
delivery of quality education was that the human input into the education of black
children was unacceptable.”125 In support of this claim, Dahlk explained that, “Teacher
turnover was higher in [inner] core schools, and since seniority was the general rule
guiding teacher transfers, these schools had a greater percentage of less-experienced
teachers.”126 Other grievances Milwaukee blacks had with MPS were a result of the
Milwaukee Public School Board’s attempts to address Brown without dealing with
segregation directly. Two examples of this were allowing students to transfer from their
neighborhood school to any school within the system and intact busing. Students utilizing
the school transfer policy were disproportionately white, while students being bused were
disproportionately black. Discussing intact busing, Bill Dahlk explained, “Through this
method, an entire black class would be bused to a white school with an available
classroom… At the receiving school members of the black class would not be dispersed
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across various classrooms, but would be taught in their ‘own’ room. Often the class
would then be bused back to its home school for lunch… and then back to the receiving
school for afternoon classes.”127 Isolating these students and reducing their classroom
time made this a racist policy that enraged many blacks. Lloyd Barbee took this criticism
even further, arguing that the policy was not only racist, but also psychologically
damaging.
According to James K. Nelsen, “Barbee began researching the extent of racial
segregation in MPS in 1962,” and after a year and a half asked to meet with then “State
School Superintendent Angus P. Rothwell to present evidence that de facto segregation
existed in Milwaukee and was harmful to children.”128 As a result Rothwell sent
questionnaires to five Wisconsin superintendents and “After reading the results…
declared that he could find no evidence that MPS intended to segregate students.”129
Rothwell and other white Milwaukeeans attributed the racial makeup of schools to the
neighborhood school policy MPS operated under. Milwaukee’s intense ethnic history
supported this explanation, with different groups living in distinct neighborhood enclaves
throughout the city, resulting in homogenous neighborhood schools. This longstanding
practice made it difficult for reform activists fighting for integration to garner public
support.130 Pressure from the NAACP caused the school board to create “a seven-member
Committee on Equality and Educational Opportunity in August 1963 to study racial
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problems in MPS.”131 Four conservatives and three liberals made up the committee, and
in the fall of 1963 hearings about the racial issues surrounding MPS began.132
In their first meeting with the board (nicknamed the Story committee after its
most conservative member, attorney Harold Story), “a coalition of members of the
NAACP, CORE, and the Near Northside Non-Partisan Conference (NNNPC), requested
at least 15 minutes at a school board meeting to present a CORE report on problems with
segregated education in Milwaukee.”133 The four problems they discussed were problems
with intact busing, “failure to assign black teachers to black schools, the assignment of
inexperienced teachers to black schools, and alleged discrimination in the ‘free-transfer
policy.’”134 At the end of the meeting the Wisconsin NAACP also “threatened a school
boycott unless plans were put in place by January 30 to integrate the schools.” The
coalition was invited back for a second meeting on January 21st.135
Harold Story knew that many “established black community organizations” in
Milwaukee were not behind Lloyd Barbee and the NAACP’s campaign to integrate the
schools. Instead, these groups were in support of “compensatory education;” educational
programs aimed at providing the cultural experience disadvantage children were assumed
to be lacking.136 During this time, “The Milwaukee Urban League continued its struggle
to improve black schooling on a separate track from that of Barbee and the Wisconsin
NAACP.”137 Story “attempted to drive a wedge between them and Barbee’s nascent

131

Ibid., 42-43.
Ibid., 43-44.
133
Ibid., 44.
134
Ibid., 45.
135
Ibid., 45.
136
Dougherty, More Than One Struggle, 89.
137
Ibid., 91.
132

43
integrationists”138 by bringing in members of the Urban League to speak at the hearings
and weaken Barbee’s case. In December 1963 when “The Wisconsin NAACP finally
made its presentation” to the board, Barbee insisted that, “No amount of compensatory
education will repair the damage done to students and teachers by segregation… Equal
educational opportunity is impossible without racial integration.”139
At the January 21st hearing, Story and the committee insulted Barbee and the
coalition by not allowing him to sit with the representatives from CORE and the NNNCP.
Barbee and the coalition walked out, and the media coverage of the incident created more
support for Barbee and his cause.140 Cornelius Golightly, one of the liberal members of
the committee, commented that, “The Negro community seems to have consolidated
itself on the grounds that the School Board has deliberately made no positive move to
concern themselves with the issue raised in July.”141 When the school board did not meet
the deadline Barbee’s coalition established for a comprehensive plan to integrate the
schools, Barbee and his supporters began picketing and demonstrating against MPS.142
This led to a broader coalition including Barbee, the NAACP, CORE, the NNNCP,
Milwaukee parents, and ministers called “the Milwaukee United School Integration
Committee (MUSIC), to which Barbee was elected chairperson. Its purpose was to
organize a grassroots movement against school segregation.”143 MUSIC was successful
in receiving media attention for their protests, pickets, and boycotts, but did not have
much of an impact on the committee or the school board. In May of 1965, “Despite the
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increased pressure, the Story committee voted four to three to recommend the
continuation and expansion of compensatory education programs for inner-city schools
rather than desegregate.”144 Barbee and the coalition concluded a more forceful approach
including the use of the courts would be necessary for desegregating MPS.145
Lloyd Barbee filed suit against the Milwaukee Public School board and
superintendent on June 17, 1965 “on behalf of the parents of thirty-two black students
and nine white students in Amos et al. vs. the Board of School Directors of the City of
Milwaukee.”146 Barbee would spend the following fourteen years on this legal case as he
“was faced with the formidable task of proving that segregation was not just a result of
residential patterns. He had to prove the school board had deliberately tried to keep the
school system segregated.”147 Barbee’s argument focused on five main points:
1) The school board established school boundary lines that produced
segregation;
2) It approved construction of predominantly black schools;
3) It allowed white students to transfer but restricted black pupils to
segregated schools;
4) Instead of taking a “color-blind” approach to staff assignment, it preferred
black teachers and other black staff work in black schools and allowed white
staff to transfer out of such schools; and
5) It failed to integrate “intact” bused students with white students at
receiving schools.148
While Barbee provided compelling arguments for all five of these issues, the most
convincing evidence and, according to James K. Nelsen, “perhaps most damaging, was
intact busing.”149 Barbee provided a report on intact busing dating back to 1957 showing
clear racial disparities of the program that then Superintendent Howard Vincent could not
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defend. Barbee also provided testimony from teachers about the damaging effects of lost
classroom time and the ineffectiveness of the program.150 Lloyd Barbee used this
evidence to conclude this process was “psychologically damaging”151 to black students
who participated. Although Barbee’s case was strong, fierce opposition from Milwaukee
whites and the school board prevented a settlement until 1979. After Barbee successfully
won his case against the Milwaukee Public Schools in 1976 the school board appealed
the decision, resulting in a three-year retrial. During this time a desegregation plan was
implemented in Milwaukee and proved difficult to execute.
During the period of desegregation, Superintendent Lee McMurrin led MPS, a
champion of specialty and magnet schools as the way the district could desegregate
voluntarily.152 McMurrin arrived in Milwaukee from Toledo in 1975 while the city
awaited the Judge Reynold’s decision regarding desegregation. When the decision was
handed down, “McMurrin and his staff were ready with a list of specialty schools to help
the city desegregate voluntarily by attracting white students from outlying neighborhoods
to inner-city schools.”153 Magnet school theory, which was developed in the 1960s,
argued that, “families could be enticed into choosing integrated schools by offering them
distinctive, improved education programs.”154 When Judge Reynolds’ decision came
down in January of 1976 ordering “MPS authorities to develop a desegregation plan to
begin in September of that same year,”155 McMurrin continued to push magnet schools as
the way to achieve desegregation in order to satisfy the ruling’s requirements because,
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“McMurrin’s main goal was to achieve as much desegregation as the court required while
producing minimal resistance and flight by whites.”156 McMurrin’s approach to
desegregation focused on “a phased-in desegregation approach, relying upon voluntary
movement and specialty or magnet schools… Most of the physical movement to achieve
desegregation would be done by black children.”157 This approach to desegregation
would create a backlash from the black community. Placing the burden of desegregation
on black pupils led Howard Fuller to vehemently oppose the plan.
In March of 1976, Lloyd Barbee told the Milwaukee Courier, Milwaukee’s black
newspaper, that black parents must “beware of ‘phony’ and ‘rhetorical’ school
desegregation proposals.”158 Discussing the Milwaukee Teachers Education Association
(MTEA) and the school board, Barbee warned that the white power structures would try
to “feign desegregation” while continuing the status quo of MPS. Over the next three
years, through coverage in the Courier, it became clear that a settlement would be
difficult. Deep distrust of the school board was apparent from black Milwaukeeans,
making them wary of any offer. The newspaper also reported examples of resistance to
desegregation altogether and a call for community control of the schools.159 Community
control of schools called for neighborhood power over how local schools would be run.
Historian Jerald E. Podair in his study of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville crisis in New York
wrote,
It is, however, not difficult to understand the eagerness of community
control supporters to embrace the idea of community as a means to black
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empowerment… Conditions in black-majority schools were worsening,
and the gap in achievement between black and white schools was
growing each year. Clearly, something had to change, or an entire
generation of black-school children would be lost. It was this sense of
political exhaustion and impending catastrophe that led…. survivors of
the school integration wars in New York to embrace community control
of education with such fervor. Whether or not they understood the full
implications of their decision for the long term, in the short run, with
ghetto education in crisis, there seemed no other choice.160
With Milwaukee schools following the same pattern, some activists would fight for a
similar approach.
As the retrial continued, different groups emerged to take desegregation efforts
into their own hands. Triple O was one of these groups, a community-based organization
led by Larry Harwell founded in 1967 to “provide input into policy and services” for
Milwaukee public housing residents.161 In 1977 Triple O sponsored a group to explore
education efforts in Milwaukee called “Blacks for Two Way Integration.” They began an
informal campaign to expose how desegregation was actually affecting black youth,162
and in September of 1977 issued a statement “calling parents of the Black community to
send their children to the schools nearest them” for the start of the 1977-1978 school
year,163 threatening desegregation efforts.
In the spring of 1979, “attorney Barbee and the school board defendants finally
negotiated a settlement that was approved by Judge Reynolds.”164 According to Jack
Dougherty, “The terms guaranteed that at least 75 percent of the city’s students would
attend a desegregated school,” and that “these racially balanced schools would be defined
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as 20 to 60 percent black.”165 But a lot had changed since Barbee had originally filed the
lawsuit. Neighborhood segregation had become more intense, and with the new plan
some predominantly black schools were going to have to shift out existing students to
make room for potential white students. The forced movement of students this settlement
implied, along with the increased support for community control of black schools
throughout the retrial, set the stage for a new kind of activism in Milwaukee.
During the second half of the 1960s, blacks in Milwaukee still disagreed on the
best approach to providing quality education for black students. According to historian
Bill Dahlk, “In Milwaukee, Larry Harwell and the Triple O organizing group he led were
the most prominent advocates”166 for community control. For Harwell, the most troubling
aspect of desegregation was the humiliation it implied. He said,
The desegregation battle is nothing more than a farce. Too many of us
have been duped into believing that if our children are bused across town
and allowed to sit next to a white kid, something magical is going to
happen; the white air will swell the black brain. That’s not only ridiculous,
it’s racist. The only thing our black child will learn is that he is being
taught to believe he is inferior, must go outside his community to learn,
and that black teachers can’t teach him, or that he can’t be taught in a
Central City school.167
The settlement that resolved Milwaukee’s desegregation case “left about twentythree schools all-black.”168 Integration supporters were unhappy about these schools, and
some of these activists “saw the specialty schools as the best way to achieve voluntary
desegregation along with quality education.”169 Specialty schools offered a unique
curriculum focused on an academic specialty with the hopes of attracting students from
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different parts of the city, facilitating integration. Harwell and other proponents of black
influence over black education, on the other hand, saw these schools as an opportunity for
increased community control over some educational institutions. This battle would come
to a head over what to do with North Division High School, a school that had
experienced decline after it transitioned from a predominantly white student body to a
predominantly black one in the late 1950s. According to Bill Dahlk, MPS statistics
reported that “for the 1978-1979 school year (the first year of operation for the new
facility), North had the lowest overall GPA of city high schools (1.124, where A is 4), the
highest subject failure rate (46.8 percent), the lowest standardized-test scores, and the
third worst attendance (70.5 percent present).”170 North Division had closed and was set
to reopen in September of 1978 as a rebuilt facility with a focus on medicine and
dentistry.171 The school board hoped this magnet curriculum would attract white students
but were realistic about the difficulty of getting white students to attend school in a
predominantly black neighborhood. In order for whites to be attracted to the new school,
school officials believed, “The only way to accomplish this feat… would be to clean out
the school—rid it of the current student body and start fresh.”172 What to do with North
Division would quickly become the battleground where the fight between integration and
community control in Milwaukee would be waged. This fight would also spark the
beginning of a long and tumultuous relationship between the Milwaukee Public Schools
and Howard Fuller.
Fuller’s primary concerns when he returned to Milwaukee were finding a job to
support his family and dealing with his health problems. Fuller needed a back operation,
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and on his way into surgery “he had a myelogram, which left him incapacitated with
migraine headaches.”173 A college friend got Fuller a job selling insurance for the
Equitable Life Assurance Society, and a year later he gained employment as an associate
director of the Equal Opportunity Program at Marquette University.174 Two years into
Fuller’s employment, the Milwaukee County Journal reported that, “Besides affording
disadvantaged students an opportunity to receive a college degree from a prestigious,
private university, it focuses on the all-around needs and sensitivities of its students on a
one-to-one basis.”175 The program provided academic support, personal and career
counseling, developmental seminars, and financial aid to every student admitted into the
program. It also operated on a five-year plan to accommodate students with greater needs
or those working while attending school.176 Fuller’s position at Marquette demonstrated
his ongoing commitment to the education of disadvantaged blacks. His job allowed him
to assist low-income members of the community eager for educational opportunities
without requiring the stressful task of on-the-ground activism. This period improved his
health and restored his vigor, which he would need for the battles he would fight in the
following months.
When news of the school board’s plan to “clean out” the existing student body of
North Division High school spread, both former and current students came together to
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fight its implementation. On June 2, 1979, the Milwaukee Courier reported the plan for
North entailed “the removal of all present students by the fall of 1980. Those students
who will then be juniors and seniors will be automatically transferred to other schools. At
this point, the school will be closed to all students in the community who will not be
involved in a city-wide medical science specialty.” The article described the school board
president’s defense of the decision, claiming that this approach was “in the best interest
of the community.” During the president’s explanation, protestors of the plan walked
out.177 In the weeks that followed, nearly 10,000 signatures were gathered and students
organized public marches.178 This outpouring of community support and subsequent
community action forced the school board to hold a special hearing on the matter. Old
high school friends and classmates of Fuller contacted him to join the movement and
attend the hearing.179 Fuller’s fond memories of North Division, and the unequivocal
support he felt the community provided him while attending the school drove him to join
the fight. His goal to provide the youth in Milwaukee with the same learning experience
and community cohesion he grew up with reinforced his commitment to his race.
Witnessing instances of integration that continued to isolate blacks while in Durham
drove him to make sure black students in Milwaukee did not suffer the same fate. At the
special hearing, Fuller impressed the audience and according to historian Jack Dougherty,
“delivered a powerful speech about ‘our’ school,”
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We say that it is ours because it does indeed belong to us…The black
community is once again being forced to bear the brunt of the so-called
integration process…What sacrifice is the white community being asked
to make? If this school is going to be such a great thing, then why can’t we
stay there?... We say no! And ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!180
Fuller became the spokesman of the Coalition to Save North Division, fighting for
community control of the school rather than the racial separatism he had fought for in
Durham. Fuller and other opponents “put together an alternative proposal for North. It
called for the school to remain essentially a neighborhood high school with a medicaldental specialty and a sixty/forty black/white mix as a goal.”181 Fuller understood the
educational reform climate in Milwaukee well enough to know that supporting an
integrated North would help garner support for the new plan while creating a quality
educational opportunity for every black student who hoped to attend the school. It was
not necessary for the school to be all-black in order to provide this opportunity to lowincome blacks in the neighborhood, and a broad-based coalition that transcended racial
lines would help further the possibility of North remaining accessible to his people. In
September 1979 Fuller told reporters that, “the struggle… is not against integration. That
is a fallacy. The school should be predominantly Black, although it is important for
people to learn to live and function together.” Fuller continued by saying what was most
important was his belief that the students “should have some freedom of choice about
where they will attend school… if Pulaski, South Division, Hamilton, etc. are 60 percent
or more white, why can’t we have one school in a black neighborhood that remains 60
percent black? That’s all we’re asking.”182 As support for a predominantly black,
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integrated North increased, “Fuller and the Coalition strategically merged community
organizing and courtroom tactics to attain their objective, as Barbee and MUSIC had
done years earlier.”183 Like Barbee before him, Fuller would succeed with this strategy.
In order for Fuller to be successful, he had to win support from the school board
that was responsible for the initial plan for North Division. His ability to succeed and
thrive in all-black and all-white situations he had previously experienced became clear
during this task. Doris Stacy, a liberal school board member at the time of the fight to
save North Division, “praised Fuller for his demeanor in presenting the Coalition
arguments before the Board,” and credited him with being able to earn “begrudged
respect from even the conservatives on the board.”184 Fuller’s experience in navigating
different worlds had made him a pluralist, and he told Jonathan Coleman, “I’ve never had
a problem being in all white (sic) situations, even when I went to Carroll. I have lived in
Black communities in Durham, in Greensboro. I was perfectly comfortable with that
situation. It didn’t harm my interaction with white people any way because that was still
at both an individual and a business level… I think it ought to be possible for there to be
diversity without people have to give up their sense of themselves in order to deal with
each other in a real fashion.”185 Fuller’s belief that blacks could retain their identities
while working with and amongst whites would be an integral part of his activism in
Milwaukee. His willingness to work alongside anyone who shared his goals, and his
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unwillingness to work with those who placed their self-interest ahead of those goals
underscored his commitment to providing quality education to black children.
As school desegregation plans all over the country were disproportionately
burdening black students and families, black activists began to “redefine the popular
meaning of Brown v. Board to address the context of their particular struggles.”
According to Jack Dougherty, these activists
came to see the same conclusion reached in 1978 by Robert Carter, a
leading attorney with Thurgood Marshall in the Brown trial. Looking back
over twenty-five years of litigation, Carter recalled that the NAACP’s
major challenge in 1954 was to destroy the “separate but equal” doctrine
of the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision. To do so, Carter and his
colleagues “fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and
integrated education were one and the same,” thereby equating the two
concepts. But after their initial legal victory, the real target of their
attack—racism—had changed over time, adapting itself to privilege white
interests in school desegregation arrangements in several locations. While
Carter personally continued to support integration, he eventually came to
understand “the goal was not integration but equal educational
opportunity,” thereby distinguishing between the two concepts he had
fused together during the 1950s. Once Carter and other black education
reformers had clarified these terms, they opened their minds to consider
alternative strategies for reaching their goal.186
Howard Fuller underwent a similar transformation. After fighting for integration
in Cleveland in 1965, by 1979 he had shifted his outlook on how to effectively provide
equal educational opportunity to low-income black students. His methods changed while
his purpose remained the same, exhibiting his dedication to his race. In an interview
conducted nearly fifteen years after the fight to save North Division, Fuller recognized
his seemingly contradictory interests:
Interesting enough, the first time I got involved in a battle having to do
with secondary schools was when I was in my final year of graduate
school and, if we can think, that was during the period of the struggle for
desegregation in the North…To show you how I’ve changed over the
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years, a decision had been made to bus kids into what was then Little Italy,
and this was the first experience that I had with intact busing, because they
were busing the kids… they were going to build a school in Glenville, and
we were protesting that if they built the school there, it was going to be
all-black, and so that’s why we were laying down at the site, to prevent
them from building a building there. This was likely my first exposure to
struggle, but interesting enough, it was around integration, so then when
you roll the clock forward to ’76, the battle around North Division was in
essence the opposite, although it was not to create an all-black school, it
was to create a predominantly black school, and we were arguing that is
still an integrated school.187
In exploring this shift further, Fuller explained that during the 1960s he thought that
integration, simply having black students in the same room with white students, meant
equal access: that if black children were in the same school as white children they would
have to have the same opportunity, “Now I know a lot more. I didn’t know about
tracking, all the ways that kids can be destroyed even though they’re sitting in the same
room.188 Tracking occurs after standardized test results are used to separate students by
their perceived abilities. According to urban education researcher Cassandra A.
Simmons, “Standardized testing and curriculum tracking deal the most devastating blows
in the resegregation of minority students. Judged inferior by overreliance on the results of
inappropriate tests, disproportionate numbers of minority children are separated into socalled special education or compensatory education curriculum tracks. Once so placed,
these children do not receive the academic training necessary to overcome whatever
educational deficiencies they may actually have.”189 Fuller saw the separation of black
students because of tracking in Durham, which did not result in the equal access Fuller
and other integrationists hoped it would. Fighting for one approach to providing access
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and opportunity to low-income black students in Cleveland, and then discovering that
that approach was failing those children in Durham forced Fuller to reassess how to
create actual opportunity in Milwaukee. For him, securing access to the new impressive
North Division facility to neighborhood students was one way to do this.
Fuller and the Coalition were able to gain support “from the city’s two oldest
(and sometimes rival) black organizations, the Milwaukee Urban League and the
Milwaukee NAACP” by combining “the Urban League’s commitment to black
communities and opportunity with the NAACP’s traditional focus on equity and
integration.”190 In November of 1979, the Milwaukee Sentinel reported that the
Monitoring Board assembled as part of the original settlement in the desegregation case
found that, “The Milwaukee School Board should reconsider its plans for North Division
High School and should permit all the present pupils at the school to graduate from
there... the School Board’s plan impedes not only educational quality for the North pupils
but also the equality of education for blacks…. the impact, not the intent, of the School
Board’s decision clearly places an inequitable burden on black students and their
parents.”191 Regardless of this critique, Marian McEvilly, the black school board member
who proposed the initial plan for a new North, resisted the Coalition’s demands because
of her integrationist stance, and the battle continued.
After the Monitoring Board recommended the adoption of the Coalition’s plan to
the school board, the school board accused the Monitoring Board of abusing its power.
The Wisconsin Magistrate was assigned the task of deciding whether or not the board did
so, and on January 12, 1980 he delivered his decision that the panel did not “exceed [its]
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authority” and the school board should take the recommendation into account.192
Increased pressure and support from the Coalition and the media forced the board to
reconsider its position, and in April 1980 the Coalition won the battle to keep North open
to neighborhood students.193 This decision meant the high school would set an enrollment
limit of 2,000 students, 60 percent of whom would be black.194 It soon became clear to
Fuller, however, that the disbanding of the Coalition after the victory for North Division
did not mean his work was over: “Fuller soon learned a humbling lesson that many other
black education activists had learned before him: winning one high-profile battle for
school reform did not necessarily improve the actual quality of education for black
students.”195 North Division and other inner-city Milwaukee schools continued to decline
in population, graduation rates, and literacy rates. This discouraging fact inspired Fuller
to do more research, and commit more activism, underscoring his deep allegiance to the
education of black children.
One difficulty Howard Fuller faced as a black activist leader in Milwaukee was
appealing to varying schools of black political thought within the city. Fuller has
explored this spectrum throughout his life from his own personal role in these divides.
For Fuller, “there were two 60s. There was the Civil Rights 60s and there was the Black
Power 60s. What we have to do is go back and understand what the links between all of
those movements. Then we have to look at no matter what was happening then, what is
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the reality that we face now.”196 When Fuller began teaching meetings at the old
Commando headquarters for black students on the North side of Milwaukee in 1990, he
said he started them “to get people to understand the trends in the development of African
American history in this country… Malcolm X was very important to me. So was
Frederick Douglass.”197 In explaining trends in black activism, Fuller told his Commando
classroom,
Those trends have been people who say we ought to go back to Africa,
said if you go back to the Martin Delaneys of the world we have no
business being here and our best thing is to get the hell out of here.
Garvey, Delaney… You have Booker T. who comes up in the midst of
everything and says Hey, what we gotta do is work with our hands,
develop our own economic case and we should not be trying to unite with
white people. We shouldn’t be a threat to them, we don’t need a vote, a
whole bunch of stuff. And it was an accommodationist notion. Then you
had DuBois saying what are you talking about? We need to be demanding
the right to vote, we need to be demanding this, we need to be demanding
that, we need to be demanding to be viewed as first class citizens like
everybody else. This view that you’re talking about we should just hang
over here and work with our hands and stuff is not what we ought to be
doing, okay? Then you have Malcolm who comes on the scene and gets
tied back into really a lot of what Garvey was talking about because if you
trace Elijah Mohammad you go back to Garvey. Garvey came to America
to meet Booker T. That’s why he came here. Because he read up on
slavery and was impacted by Booker T’s views. Then you have Martin
Luther King. So all I’m trying to say is even when you get a discussion
about black colleges those black colleges were part of various trends of
thought.198
Howard Fuller’s understanding that divisions within the black community were
not new allowed him not to be overwhelmed or discouraged by the divisiveness of his
own community. Instead this understanding allowed him to effectively create coalitions
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and work for change. Fuller’s next coalition would grow out of increased frustrations
with police brutality. On July 9th, 1981, Ernest Lacy, a 22 year old black man, died in
police custody after being mistaken by three white Milwaukee police officers for a rape
suspect.199 After inquiries into the officers’ past, including previous instances of violence,
Howard Fuller and Black Panther Militia leader Alderman Michael McGee came together
to form the Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy. While Michael McGee used his political
power to call for radical, sometimes even violent demonstrations to facilitate change,
Fuller was someone whom black and white constituencies were willing to work with.
Although Fuller did not agree with some of McGee’s aggressive tactics, putting those
differences aside in order to gain justice for Ernest Lacy shows his willingness to work
with any individuals fighting to uplift the race. Through the desegregation and
community control reforms discussed above it is clear there has never been a unified
voice representing the black community’s approach to education in Milwaukee. These
divides were something Fuller would have to grapple with, especially when appointed
superintendent. Trying to work with all of these different factions in hopes of providing
educational opportunities for low-income blacks was an effort that would leave Fuller
“little personal time, little sleep, health problems, and two failed marriages” which was,
“in his opinion…the price you paid for being a race man.”200
When reflecting on his activism with North Division and Ernest Lacy, Fuller told
historian Jack Dougherty, “I have always felt, based on my history of the struggle, if you
just have, we did the same thing with Lacy… If you just have one thing, that people are
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just out in the street, you have no other avenue, no other points of leverage, unless you can
effect people in some way, they’ll leave you out in the streets forever, if they just decide
they can put up with you.”201 Fuller took the same combined approach of on-the-ground
activism and the courts that he used for the struggle to save North Division as he did for
Ernest Lacy. This double-pronged approach won the Lacy family a $500,000 settlement
from the Milwaukee Police Department. More influential, however, was that according to
journalist Tom Bamberger, “the Lacy protest provided the impetus for the 1984 legislative
restructuring of the police department.”202 Seeing this type of activism succeed, in 1982
Fuller told another Milwaukee journalist, Kevin Merida, that what was most needed in the
black community were two political organizations: one to bring people to the polls and
one to bring them to the streets. He continued, “Anybody with any sense knows that
blacks in Milwaukee are politically impotent, period… if you’re even relatively honest,
you’d have to admit that. That while people give lip service to black people around
election time, no one seriously worries about the black community.”203 Although Fuller
was willing to work with white politicians whom he saw as agents for uplifting his race,
he was keenly aware this goal might not be their first priority. Fuller took every
opportunity he could to raise awareness and make black Milwaukeeans a priority, from
Milwaukee to Madison and back again. Fuller went from working at Marquette until 1983
to a position in the Wisconsin Department of Employment Relations until 1986 followed
by a two-year stint as dean at the Milwaukee Area Technical College.204 During this time,
Fuller earned his doctorate from Marquette University with a dissertation entitled “The
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Impact of the Milwaukee Public School System’s Desegregation Plan on Black Students
and the Black Community (1976-1982).”205
After the fight for justice for Ernest Lacy had “dominated public conversation in
the black community” for two years, Howard Fuller and Michael McGee, now very
public figures in the black community, “used this newly acquired platform to launch
subsequent dissent, Fuller focusing on education and McGee on the economic plight of
black Milwaukeeans.”206 According to Bill Dahlk, during his time with the Lacy
coalition, “Fuller reached an important point in his approach toward reform. Declaring
‘there’s got to be some of us inside the system.’”207 While much of Fuller’s activism had
been tied to his outsider status, his continued success of combining on-the-ground
activism and working within the legal system led him to try to work for change on the
inside. While many black activists during this time were assessing the effects of
desegregation, discontent for the program continued to rise. Three years of desegregation
had resulted in many inner-city, predominantly black schools closing, with black students
being disproportionately bussed further and further away from their homes in order to
foster desegregated schools. While desegregation was not producing the desired effects of
its implementation, “by 1982, some integrationists were ready to push for metropolitan
school integration as the answer.”208 Fuller saw the negative effect desegregation of MPS
was having on the black community and decided to enter into political office in order to
expose the inequalities happening at the municipal level, and ultimately to stop them
from spreading to the metropolitan area as a whole.
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As black populations became more concentrated in urban areas throughout the
1970s, “The National Task Force on Desegregation Strategies” concluded that, “the
simple demographic fact is that many large city school districts cannot desegregate by
themselves. For children in such districts, the best hope for attending a desegregated
schools lies in the implementation of the metropolitan school desegregation strategies—
i.e., desegregation plans which do not stop at the city line, but rather encompass at least
some of the surrounding suburban areas.”209 A voluntary city-suburb transfer program
(known as Chapter 220) had been in effect in Milwaukee since 1976, using a metropolitan
approach to facilitate desegregation on a small scale. As this program was not having any
meaningful effect on Milwaukee Public Schools’ racial makeup, in 1983 MPS looked
toward broad metropolitan desegregation as the next step in trying to integrate schools,
drawing mixed support from Milwaukee blacks and other integration advocates.
According to Bill Dahlk, “In October 1983, the MPS board voted to propose to
twenty-nine suburbs that they join with MPS in planning for increased metropolitan
school desegregation. The board proposed a substantial change: reorganization of the
metropolitan school districts into one unified district. Its goal for MPS was to stabilize
student enrollment at 45 percent white, 45 percent black, and 10 percent ‘other’ through
equal two-way transfer… By December 1983, the MPS board recognized that
reorganization into one district was a non-starter and replaced it with the goal of a number
of smaller districts that would combine sections of MPS with groups of suburban
schools.”210 After much debate, in the spring of 1984 the MPS board proposed
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reorganizing MPS and “twenty-four suburban school districts into six new districts.”211
When the suburbs and state did not embrace the proposal, “the Milwaukee school board
and the NAACP turned to a lawsuit on the grounds that the suburban schools and the state
were deliberately contributing to segregation by rejecting the metropolitan-wide
proposal.”212 As secretary of the Department of Employment Relations and a known
Milwaukee activist, Fuller weighed in metropolitan desegregation with “the same
criticisms he had used against MPS desegregation: ‘What you will have is a way of
closing even more black schools and spreading the kids out even more without addressing
the issues of quality education.’”213
Fuller had wanted to get involved in politics at the state level because he saw an
opportunity to have more of a direct positive impact on his people than he was having in
Milwaukee. He told historian Jack Dougherty years later, “One of the reasons that I went
to Madison that a lot of people never realized is that I felt that I had done, that I had no
more leverage here, but that if I could go to Madison, that I could use my position there to
convince the governor to do something.”214 Democrat Anthony (Tony) Earl ran for
governor in 1982 after incumbent Lee Dreyfus decided not to run for re-election. Fuller
led Earl’s campaign within Milwaukee’s black community, and after Earl won the election
Fuller’s reward was an appointment as “secretary of the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Department, a role that enabled Fuller to build ties with governmental and business
leaders, links that later enhanced his educational endeavors.”215 Fuller went to Madison in
order to “shift policy discussions from metropolitan desegregation to quality, effective
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MPS schools,”216 which he could not do in Milwaukee. As it became clear that MPS was
ready to begin a court battle for the desegregation plan described above, “Fuller made a
significant proposal: he requested a moratorium on metropolitan desegregation discussions
until December 1984 and called for Governor Anthony Earl… to create a special
commission to study the effectiveness of MPS education and to develop plans for
improving its quality and making desegregation more equitable.”217 Fuller was not alone
in his request. With MPS students’ achievement continuing to decline, “among state and
Milwaukee area business and government officials, there was a growing concern that
public schools, and especially MPS, were increasingly falling short in effectively
preparing youth for both college and the workforce.”218 As a result of these pressures, in
June of 1984 “membership of the Governor’s Commission on the Quality of Education in
Metropolitan Milwaukee (the Mitchell Commission) was announced,”219 with Fuller
serving on the panel, and “After nearly a year of research, the Mitchell Commission began
releasing its findings in May of 1985.”220
According to Fuller, his goal in supporting the creation of the Mitchell
Commission was to expose how the desegregation efforts within MPS had negatively and
disproportionately affected the district’s black students. Trying to document the specific
struggles his people were experiencing as a result of desegregation demonstrates Fuller’s
commitment to providing quality education to black students rather than simply getting
them into schools with white bodies. As he had seen in Cleveland and Durham, this
mixing was not the way to solidify opportunity and he looked to the Commission’s report
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to show that. Fuller told Jack Dougherty that exposing desegregation’s negative effects
on black student performance called for the Mitchell Commission to specifically look at
grade point averages by race of individual students. According to Fuller, Superintendent
McMurrin had not done this for two reasons, “number one, he said that Black parents
would not be able to deal with, when they saw this, they wouldn’t be able to deal with
what was actually happening… and two was that it would give racists, it would say to
racists that you were right, that they couldn’t learn. So therefore that’s why we don’t
publish the data. I was enraged.”221 Fuller disagreed with McMurrin, explaining to
Dougherty his philosophy that would he would follow from Governor Earl’s
administration to the superintendent’s chair,
My view is that, and I had that view as superintendent, no matter what it
is, you have to tell the truth, because you can’t correct the situation by
lying about the situation or hiding the situation, just like he was going to
tell me, I don’t know what I was talking about when I said there was a
racial gap, two years later they began to, and this is in the document, they
began to talk about gap schools, because we unmasked it through the
commission, the gap that existed… You have to get people to face up to
what is the reality in order to make a change. As long as you are in denial,
how in the hell are you going to face up to what is to be done. Whatever
the reason is for denial.222
The Mitchell Commission’s report lent legitimacy to claims Fuller and other education
reformers had been making for years. The results exposed “consistent under-performance
of black students, whether city or suburban,”223 negative effects of poverty on
performance, high black dropout rates, and an undeniable gap between white and black
achievement. According to Bill Dahlk, “A year after the commission’s report was first
publicized, MPS’ test scores for the 1985-86 year were released, indicating that the
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white-black gap was widening, after several years of gradual narrowing.”224 The results
created the impetus for education reformers to further reject Milwaukee’s metropolitan
desegregation plan and fight for a new strategy. Fuller used this as an opportunity to
introduce different approaches to the MPS crisis, suggesting, “Now maybe we can start to
talk about what must be done to address the problem. Now may be the time to talk about
doing something totally different.”225 The commission’s findings led Fuller to write his
dissertation about how MPS’ desegregation plan had unfairly impacted Milwaukee’s
black community. He dedicated the project to “All of the Black children who have
endured the practices of MPS over the years.”226
Fuller’s dissertation explored how the implementation of desegregation can be just
as discriminatory as segregation. Fuller based his study on “a systematic analysis of
information contained within two Milwaukee Public School System data sources: School
Enrollment by Receiving School (1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982) and School Enrollment by
Sending Attendance Area (1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982).”227 Fuller made a clear
distinction between a desegregated school and an integrated school in the following way: a
desegregated school “refers only to its racial composition,” making desegregation the
mere mixing “of bodies without reference to the quality of the interracial interaction,”
while an integrated school is “an interracial facility which boasts a climate of interracial
acceptance… when the two groups share equal status.”228 This distinction has been made
more and more in scholarly educational literature in the 21st century, as it has become
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clear that many desegregation campaigns or desegregated schools do not provide
interracial acceptance.229 The term “desegregation” has been used throughout this thesis,
as it better describes the process in Milwaukee and other cities throughout the country.
Fuller’s dissertation argues that the Brown decision, while meaningful and important to
the history of black education in the United States, was based on racist assumptions.230
Fuller argued unequivocally that the burden of desegregation was placed on black
shoulders, as his research found desegregation in MPS had “systematically bused black
students out of their attendance areas, closed schools in the black community, and
converted other black attendance area schools to specialty schools to which neighborhood
students had no attendance rights.”231 This, according to Fuller, left black students with
“only one choice—to be bused to a school outside of their attendance area.”232 For Fuller
this “forced choice” did not result in quality education for black students, with the racist
assumptions underlying the Brown decision to negatively affect black students’
educational opportunities. When reflecting on his dissertation, Fuller explained his point:
What I was trying to do in my dissertation really was to rethink why
people were able to turn the Brown decision on its head, which is in
essence what I think happened in Milwaukee, and it happened in a lot of
other places. Looking at Brown, it ended up saying that black folks were
pathological, and that in essence the only way for them to get cleansed
was to leave their own community. The philosophical underpinning was
racist. We had to fight that concept and in essence make the case that you
could have a quality education, as I was calling it then, in a school that’s
predominantly black, and that was a major leap for people to make.233
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While Fuller did not account for those black students who left their school district by
choice, his work revealed a fundamental insight that would affect decisions he made
about school reform from then on; even those individuals who exercised that choice were
exercising a “forced choice,”234 hindering their role in their own education and limiting
opportunity.
The Mitchell Commission’s findings along with Fuller’s research for his
dissertation contributed to his increasingly nationalistic proposals for education reform.
According to Bill Dahlk Fuller, “called for more African American teachers and
administrators… He urged an expanded role in the curriculum for African American
history and culture… He called for less busing and for returning black students to
neighborhood schools.”235 His increasing concern for black students within MPS and
commitment to providing them with education resulted in Fuller’s leaving Governor
Earl’s administration in 1986, “to become dean of general education at Milwaukee Area
Technical College because ‘he could not pass up the opportunity to return to Milwaukee
and be involved in the education of black people.’ Earl accepted Fuller’s resignation and
called his performance in the state job ‘nothing short of brilliant.’”236 The Milwaukee
Sentinel also praised Fuller’s achievements saying, “The black activist turned
employment relations secretary has demonstrated a mastery of public administration.”
The article went on to describe some of his achievements, including reorganizing the
department; pushing an “aggressive affirmative action campaign;” brokering a deal with
the Wisconsin State Employees Union resulting in a “one-year wage freeze;” and
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winning “respect of friend and foe alike.”237 Fuller’s return to Milwaukee and
increasingly nationalistic goals would lead him to support and propose a plan for a
separate independent school district for “North Division and its surrounding feeder
schools.”238
According to historian James K. Nelsen, “The people behind the plan believed a
return to a neighborhood-based system of education would increase parent involvement,
improve teacher morale, and encourage the development of a focused curriculum that
would reduce the dropout rate… What they were really after were choices for African
American families, choices that had not existed under the previous, segregated
system.”239 While the group was not against integration, until integrated schools yielded
more choices for blacks in Milwaukee, Fuller and his supporters argued that black
students would be “better off attending their own schools, where they could participate in
and benefit from their own community and unique American heritage.”240 In August of
1987, a group of black leaders in Milwaukee held a news conference to propose the
development of “a largely black school district on the North side [of Milwaukee].”241
State Representative Polly Williams told reporters that, “We must develop our own plan
to educate our children since no one else seems interested in doing it.”242 The group
presented a manifesto of the proposed district that quoted W.E.B. DuBois, saying, “The
Negro needs neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is education.
What he must remember is that there is no magic either in mixed schools or in segregated
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schools.”243 Proponents of the plan also stated that, “the metropolitan desegregation
suit… offers no real hope for equal educational opportunity for the majority of students
or for the equitable racial desegregation of public education in Milwaukee.”244
Proponents of the plan had “four primary objectives of the district”:
•
•
•
•

A dramatic increase in students’ academic achievement
A substantial reduction in the drop-out rate
Increased parental and community involvement in the schools
Increased excellence through increased parental choice245

At the news conference for the proposal, Polly Williams said she would introduce
this proposal to the state legislature starting a debate between black Milwaukeeans over
the separate district. This debate, according to Bill Dahlk, “divided the Milwaukee
African American community into two distinct camps, one tending toward a nationalist
orientation, willing to move outside MPS, and the other more mainstream, seeking to
work within MPS.”246 Howard Fuller, when reflecting on this divide and how it affected
black-led school reform in the latter half the twentieth century, said,
I think that it’s a reflection of how the goals and the objectives of the
black movement shifted over time, you know, but the trends have always
been there. There’s one trend been saying that we need to develop our
own, and I don’t think that that’s just a school issue, that’s the black
reality in America. So I think you can trace all of this stuff back to those
two fundamental tensions that are there, and they rise and fall at different
points in our history…those people who say we need to integrate, and
those people who say we need to build up our own. And some of us try to
merge the two, I mean like I talk about, I think you need to be demanding
change in the public schools, but I think we also need to create schools
outside of the public schools.247
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Opponents of the proposal claimed that the new district would have a segregating affect
on those schools, while proponents, like Fuller, argued that a small district would
“encourage parental involvement in the school,” which was “one of the most important
factors in student achievement.”248 Fuller also responded to critics of the proposal, telling
the Milwaukee Journal that “We’re talking about creating a new school district that is no
more separate than Shorewood is separate.”249 According to James K. Nelsen, support for
the plan came from “State Representatives Annette (Polly) Williams and Spencer Coggs,
Governor Tommy Thompson, and Assembly Speaker Tom Loftus. However, Hawthorne
Faison, the acting superintendent after McMurrin’s retirement, rejected the proposal, and
Milwaukee School Board President David Cullen vowed to challenge its constitutionality
in court.”250 Despite the divided support, “The bill managed to pass the State Assembly
on March 17, 1988, only to be killed 2 weeks later in the Senate.”251
Despite the bill’s defeat in the Wisconsin State Senate, Fuller saw this fight as a
victory: “you know while it failed, to me you have to see all of these things as sort of a
continual movement. It failed, but it raised consciousness, it pushed certain other things,
the school district, for example, in trying to react to it… I think all of those things had an
impact, because it was long enough that people had to react to it, it wasn’t some weak
thing.”252 Mikel Holt, editor of the Milwaukee County Journal, one of Milwaukee’s black
newspapers also saw the bill, despite its eventual defeat, as a positive development:
The failure of the North Division School District Plan did not discourage
parents or Black leadership… the defeat invigorated and inspired them…
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Black parents and educational leaders had secured an unprecedented
victory with the assembly approval… providing proponents with the belief
that they were one step removed from a major victory. That thought was
even more comforting given the fact that the North Division Plan had
received support from both sides of the political aisle, including the
governor.253
Fuller was back in the spotlight with the bill’s debate and had received accolades from
Governor Earl for his time with the Department of Employment Relations. In 1988,
David F. Schulz ran for Milwaukee County Executive with a campaign promise to
address minority issues. Schulz won the election, and when it came time for him to
appoint the new director for the Department of Health and Human Services, Howard
Fuller was his first choice.254
As director of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Fuller
would be exposed to a myriad of problems directly affecting blacks in Milwaukee. This
led him to see the struggles of low-income blacks in Milwaukee on a “problem
continuum.” Reflecting on the connection between his job at the DHHS and later as
superintendent, Fuller told Jonathan Coleman,
I see the school system on the front end of that continuum. I see the DHHS
on the back end of that continuum. And hopefully what you can do in this
position [as superintendent] is to help stop more individuals from reaching
the point that I saw them in when I was in my other job. It is two very
important responsibilities. It is just a question for where on that continuum
you are going to be. There has got to be a relationship between the system
and the department in terms of how do we do work together to make sure
that the school system changes so that it can teach kids and that those kids
are coming in with some chance of being able to learn.255
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Fuller’s sense of responsibility to be somewhere on that continuum amplifies his identity
as a race man. While succeeding at every job he took, Fuller could have used his skills
and connections to promote and advance himself. It is clear that his unwavering
commitment to his people surpassed his desire for self-advancement. According to Bill
Dahlk, “Fuller’s leadership style was a decisive one. His performances in the Earl
administration and at Health and Human Services indicated that he was willing to quickly
use power to implement the reforms he thought necessary to get an institution moving in
the right direction.”256 In 1988, Fuller started a Youth Initiative program to provide job
training for youth and parents, childcare, medical care, social services, intervention
programs, and prevention programs.257 In April of 1989 he proposed a safe house for
victims of child neglect and abuse that became a reality in February of 1990,258 and that
same year he started an alcohol and drug abuse treatment program called “Fighting
Back.”259 These initiatives, which showed Fuller’s commitment to Milwaukee’s
underserved population, combined with his successes in grassroots organizing and later in
Governor Earl’s administration, caused the Milwaukee School Board to consider Fuller a
viable candidate to head the school system in need of change.
The years leading up to Howard Fuller’s term as superintended are important in
understanding the reform climate he would come to operate within. Robert Peterkin was
appointed as the first black superintendent of MPS in 1988, brought in from Cambridge
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Massachusetts on a platform of change.260 According to Bill Dahlk reformers on the
school board had three major goals for his appointment: “narrow the white-black
achievement gap, decentralize decision-making, and alter the inequitable desegregation
scheme which included one-way busing and far-flung busing patterns.”261 Peterkin
looked to make these changes from within the system, implementing a decentralization
plan that “kept MPS intact but divided it into six sub-districts.”262 In February of 1990,
Peterkin revealed “The Long-Range Educational Equity Plan for Milwaukee Public
Schools,” which the Milwaukee Journal reported “streamlines and simplifies student
assignment, but also is designed to simultaneously,”
•
•
•
•
•

Improve the district’s least-successful schools.
Reduce busing, particularly for black students, and consequently
reduce the district’s transportation costs.
Give parents more choice in selecting the schools their children
attend.
Desegregate a group of virtually all-black Inner City schools.
Increase the number of students attending schools in their own
neighborhoods.263

Peterkin brought in Harvard researcher Charles V. Willie to help develop the plan, which
divided the school district into two zones. Parents would have the ability to send their
children to any school in their zone that had room. Schools would have to be
desegregated, and Willie placed that burden on the individual school: “it would be up to
individual schools to find ways to make themselves attractive to a racially diverse
population. Schools that failed to do so would come under the scrutiny of a Zone
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Coordinating Board and would be targeted for immediate improvement.”264 Black
Milwaukeeans were divided on support for the plan, with some criticizing it for not
reducing the actual number of black pupils being bused. Willie responded that, “even if
Milwaukee did not have to integrate its schools, about 19,000 black schoolchildren would
still have to be bused out of their neighborhoods because of overcrowding.”265 After
months of debate, “Peterkin had heard enough criticism of the Willie Plan by both
parents and school board members to discard most of it.”266 As change from within the
system failed, frustrated outsiders looked towards another way to actually improve
educational opportunities for low-income blacks in Milwaukee.
While the educational nationalist movement had made headway with the new
North Division District initiative in 1987, the fact that it did not pass the senate led these
reformers to look for other educational opportunities outside of MPS. Their next major
effort was supporting the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, a voucher plan. School
vouchers take the state funds allocated for students in public schools and allow parents to
use that money to pay private school tuition. Black students’ tumultuous relationship with
MPS garnered support for the program, which was being pushed foremost by Republican
Governor Tommy Thompson. In January of 1988, one thousand Wisconsin residents
were surveyed about their position on the school voucher issue. According to the
Milwaukee Journal, “Forty-eight percent of those surveyed favored a tax-supported
voucher system that would let poor families choose among public, private or parochial
schools. In Milwaukee, 59% of those surveyed supported the idea and 39% opposed
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it.”267 Fuller supported the plan, telling reporters in 1989 that, “choice can be the savior
of public education. The key to reforming the bureaucracy is progressive leadership and
empowering parents at the bottom.”268 School choice will be discussed at greater length
in Chapter 4, and is not limited to voucher programs alone. The Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program, however, focused on vouchers and had the following provisions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

It was limited to families whose income did not exceed 175
percent of the MPS poverty level.
The overall limit on the number of participants was 1 percent of
the MPS district student population.
It was limited to students who had not been in private schools the
previous year.
Choice students could not exceed 49 percent of a choice school’s
enrollment.
The voucher was limited to the amount of per-pupil state aid going
to MPS.
If the number of applying students exceeded the number of seats,
the choice school had to select the students by lottery.
The recipient schools had to be nonsectarian private schools and
had to meet general state academic standards.
The performance of the choice schools would be evaluated
periodically under the direction of the state Department of Public
Instruction.269

The bill passed in March of 1990, with state representative Polly Williams celebrating
that for the first time, poor black Milwaukeeans would have the chance to send their
children to quality private schools.270
Howard Fuller had gained respect from influential white Milwaukeeans as a result
of his time in Governor Earl’s administration as well as heading the DHHS. When Robert
Peterkin resigned from the superintendence, Howard Fuller’s name began circulating as
his possible successor. In November 1990, the Milwaukee Journal ran an article
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describing five possible candidates. The Journal described Howard Fuller as, “a black
Milwaukeean with a deep interest in education and a long track record of commitment to
the city, Fuller probably would bring to the job the strong administrative skills that
helped him reorganize what is perhaps the county’s most unwieldy department. His other
characteristics: an activist nature, pluralistic vision, and passion for social justice and
positive change.”271 While support for Fuller was not universal from white or black
Milwaukeeans, in February of 1991 the Milwaukee Journal reported that, “An effort is
quietly afoot to draft Howard Fuller as Milwaukee’s next school superintendent.”272 State
law in Wisconsin during this time, however, required “all school administrators have at
least three years of classroom teaching experience at the elementary or secondary
level.”273 While Fuller had taught extensively at the university level, his appointment as
superintendent would require an exemption from the state law. The situation in
Milwaukee’s schools, however, had become dire enough that making the effort to change
the law giving Fuller a chance at turning around Milwaukee Public Schools was worth it.
While Superintendent Robert Peterkin had not successfully reformed MPS as the board
had hoped, they turned to Fuller as the next possibility for someone who could facilitate
real change.
During the discussion of possible superintendents, an editorial in the Milwaukee
Journal reported that Milwaukee deserved Fuller as a choice for superintendent and
claimed that Fuller “more than fit the bill.” The article listed the following reasons for
Fuller’s endorsement:
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•

•

•

•

He has demonstrated a passionate concern for the children of this
community, particularly those who, because of color or family
income, have the education deck stacked against them.
He is committed to Milwaukee and Wisconsin, having lived and
worked here for much of his life. There’s little reason to fear that
Fuller would be chasing a job elsewhere in two to three years.
Because of his familiarity with the school system, Fuller wouldn’t
need much of a break-in period. That’s important in a district
where the momentum for reform has stalled.
He has held a variety of top administrative positions at both the
state and local levels, earning a great deal of respect along the
way.274

Other articles in the Journal and Sentinel discussing Fuller’s possible appointment
included the following supportive statements and endorsements:
•

•
•

•

“The fact is, the district doesn’t need a teacher. It needs a leader,
and there no other candidate can match Fuller’s passion for a better
Milwaukee, his belief in the power of learning and his commitment
to doing his share. Why not take him from running welfare, where
he catches the victims of a sometimes-mean society, and put him
on the front where fighting is fiercest?”275
“The right person at the right time for a tough job.”276
“He has deep roots in the community; he has performed admirably
in a variety of public-sector management positions; he has
repeatedly demonstrated his concern for children, particularly with
respect to their schooling. Clearly, Fuller comes with a lot of
pluses.”277
“In his career in public administration, he has piled up a record of
success in areas where prospects looked bleak... time and again he
impressively achieved what many said couldn’t be done.”278

Opponents of Fuller also voiced their opinions on why he was not the man for the job.
These frustrations ranged from changing the teaching requirement to suspicion of support
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from white business and governmental leaders as a result of his time with Governor Earl
and the DHHS:
•
•

•
•

“The process should not be tampered with for anyone.”279
“For those whites who have stated that Dr. Howard Fuller should
be selected because he is a role model and because he has a
passionate commitment to education, we say there are thousands of
citizens in the black community who have those characteristics.
Would Milwaukee businessmen advocate for the lowering of
standards for Dr. Fuller to become superintendent of the Whitefish
Bay or Shorewood public school systems?”280
“Dr. Fuller is not for the black community. He is for Dr. Fuller.”281
“I’m concerned with his preoccupation of looking for other
occupations.”282

In response to the last criticism, Fuller publicly described his strategy of working a job
until he became ineffective and willingness to change jobs in order to continue his work
of fighting for opportunities to low-income blacks. Fuller told the Milwaukee Journal, “If
you don’t move, you don’t have the breadth of experience to take certain jobs. Each time
I moved, I moved upward, and it gave me a broader experience base… How do you work
for a community in the absence of being somewhere? I’ve never been a careerist. I’ve
always thought about how I can use my skills to work for the community.”283 Fuller’s
foremost commitment was to his community and he consistently showed a willingness to
embrace opportunities that allowed him the chance to uplift and liberate his race.
The school board was ready for the next superintendent and urged state
lawmakers to vote on legislation that would remove the classroom-teaching requirement
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in order to open up the position to Fuller.284 The Milwaukee Journal reported that,
“Legislation that would make Howard Fuller eligible for the job of Milwaukee school
superintendent appears to have broad support in the Legislature,”285 including Governor
Tommy Thompson’s support. Thompson told reporters that Fuller, “has taught at the
university, taught in vocational schools, [but] he has not taught in the K-12 classroom…
Therefore, he’s not qualified to be superintendent of schools. I think it’s a ridiculous law
in Howard’s case.”286 On April 17, 1991 the Wisconsin Senate passed a bill that would
permanently “exempt Milwaukee Public Schools from a state requirement that the
superintendent have three years of teaching experience,”287 and on May 17, 1991 the
school board appointed Howard Fuller as superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools.288
According to Bill Dahlk, when Howard Fuller took office,
The sense of crisis regarding MPS and central city youth was probably at a
historic high… Drug and crime epidemics were unabated; Milwaukee
homicides, which included a disproportionate number of blacks, had risen
from 78 in 1988 to 165 in 1990. The Milwaukee black unemployment rate
was around 20 percent. More than half of MPS students were poor enough
to qualify for free or reduced schools lunch. The MPS “report card”
looked dismal: only about 40 percent of MPS ninth graders (and 33
percent of black ninth graders) were graduating in four years and only 7
percent of those had a cumulative GPA of 2.5 or better.289
Fuller’s first decision in office was eliminating the six-district structure discussed above
that he had previously supported. The plan had not effectively decentralized schools and
the Sentinel reported, “Fuller said the district should not continue with two layers of
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management ‘on top of the schools we are trying to empower.’”290 A month into his
tenure, Fuller promised the school board a plan within six months that would spell out
how he intended to improve MPS. He had the following objectives:
•
•
•

A “system of schools” where parents and teachers make the
decisions and are held responsible for student achievement.
A staff of central office administrators who understand that their
jobs exist to work for school staffs and students.
Major revisions in personnel and budgeting processes that hinder
reform.291

Fuller’s goals would decrease the power and influence of teachers’ unions and
administrators, decentralizing that power and shifting it to parents and principals. These
threats would eventually cause some Milwaukee teachers to reject Fuller’s plans and
accuse him of being anti-teacher. This relationship would eventually hinder Fuller from
making the changes he saw as necessary for reforming MPS.
In a speech to the Rotary Club in August of 1991, Fuller spelled out his goals as
superintendent. Catering to his audience, Fuller used language and rhetoric that would
appeal to the Rotarians:
We have to say unequivocally that our goal is going to be to graduate
students who can read, who can write, who can compute, who can analyze
and who can think at higher levels… I believe that people respond to
incentives, that organizations that provide incentives are more successful
than those who do not. Without incentives for success and consequences
for poor performance organizations and individuals have no impetus to
change. That’s a fact… We have to secondly create a system of schools
with characteristics that promote incentives and says that high
performance is something that we value. The third thing we have to do is
provide them rewards for positive performance and consequences for lack
of success… We need incentives and rewards that mean something. To
produce them I think that one we must allow dollars to follow the
students… in the organization that I will be proposing successful schools
290
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will attract parents, children, and funding. Unsuccessful schools will face
the consequence of reduced funding. Our budget process leads to fixed
and equitable dollar amounts to each student and allows these funds to
flow to those schools which attract students. We need to give principals
the tools which they need to manage schools. MPS principals do not hire
the staff and faculty, they do not develop and control their budgets. Few of
you would want to be a manager in an organization where you have no
control of anything but somebody told you you were accountable. We
have to in fact move to give people authority, give them power and then
hold them accountable for results. This will require the board, the
administration, and you to transfer power and authority to schools and
specifically principals.292
In this speech Fuller also said Milwaukee needed to treat parents and students as
“customers,” and that he believed the school board was also committed to making MPS a
system of schools with site-based management, allowing principals to oversee and
subsequently be held accountable for the performance of their schools. While Fuller’s
tone may have shifted due to relationships with certain business interests he cultivated
while in Madison, resources explaining these relationships were not available for this
thesis. While Fuller’s other philosophical shifts had been directly related to life
experience, it can be assumed that this gap in information would be helpful in
understanding Fuller’s business oriented strategy that is demonstrated in this speech.
In August of 1991 the first clash between Howard Fuller and the Milwaukee
Teachers Education Association (MTEA) would come from an unexpected source: a
student with a hidden camera. An NBC investigative program, “Expose,” gave a North
Division High school student a hidden camera to capture life at the school. According to
the Milwaukee Journal, the video displayed students playing dice in a class with the
teacher present, a teacher reading silently while their students misbehaved, and one

292

Howard Fuller, Speech to Rotary Club, August 6, 1991, Jonathan Coleman Papers 1976-1997,
Manuscript Collection 152, Box 3, Tape 38, Golda Meir Library Archives, University of WisconsinMilwaukee, 2-3, 11-12.

83
teacher telling students to “pretended they were reading,” among other “disturbing”
segments. Fuller suspended three teachers featured on the tape without pay and scheduled
emergency misconduct meetings.293 Fuller was not shy in his criticism of those teachers,
saying, “My view quite blatantly is that people have given up, and if they can’t teach
these kids, then we need to get someone who can.”294 Teachers believed they were being
unfairly judged and pointed to the schools and students as the impetus for this kind of
behavior. When the school board decided to extend one teacher’s unpaid suspension for
the remainder of the school year, Don Ernest, executive director of the MTEA said, “The
MTEA is totally committed to defending due process of all its members… The MTEA is
not going to let any members be unfairly treated and unjustly penalized.” Fuller showed
his commitment to making teachers accountable and responded, “I will continue to make
judgments based on what I see at the time I see it… Whatever it takes to function in the
interest of our children, I think we should do it.”295 Members of the Milwaukee
community not affiliated with MPS backed Fuller’s decision while teachers and MTEA
representatives publicly criticized him.
The strain between Fuller and the teachers and their union worsened when Fuller
began lobbying for the power to close failing schools; “under Fuller’s failing-school
proposal, a school could be closed for having poor academic performance or an
inadequate learning environment, and reopened under new administrative leadership and
perhaps a new teaching staff.”296 MTEA president Michael Langyel called this proposal
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“a slap in the face,” claiming “it gives the impression that they [teachers] are the primary
cause of the educational problems in MPS.” Fuller defended the proposal saying, “I don’t
see this as teacher-bashing… We’re trying to create a variety of different options to
educate kids.”297 This drive to create options would drive a wedge between Fuller and the
MTEA that would eventually lead to his resignation.
Fuller proposed other reforms that were also met with immediate criticism in his
attempt to provide quality education for low-income blacks in Milwaukee. In February of
1992, Fuller “proposed a ten-year building and facility-expansion plan to solve serious
problems of overcrowded schools, overly large class sizes, too much busing, and deferred
facility maintenance… He proposed building fifteen new schools and expanding fourteen
existing ones. The total cost would be $474 million, of which $366 million would be
financed by long-term borrowing. This would necessitate approval through a voter
referendum.”298 Fuller hoped to garner support for his expansion plan by showing
Milwaukee taxpayers that the staff of MPS was committed to the plan and called for a
one-year pay freeze. According to Bill Dahlk, “This would enable the district to actually
reduce the school property tax for the year and potentially increase voter support for
MPS.”299 The Milwaukee Journal reported that, “Langyel called the idea of a freeze an
insult to teachers,” and quoted him saying, “Teachers are overwhelmingly opposed…I’m
supremely confident that our position represents the vast majority of our members.”300 In
discussing the plan with his Saturday morning class, Fuller claimed that,
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I am not against teachers. I’m pro-teachers. I believe that you have to
reduce class size. I think that is best for the kids because it will enable to
the teacher to teach better. But how do you get the smaller class size? You
have to build the new building. How do you get the new building? You
have to go to the taxpayers and you have to ask them for more money.
What do we have to do to stand a chance to win that? You have to show
taxpayers that you are willing to do some things differently than we have
been doing. So the teachers have to understand that unless they are willing
to show flexibility in how we do things, you are never going to get a
taxpayer to vote for a new school building. If you don’t get new building,
how are you going to reduce class sizes?301
Howard Fuller had always found it intriguing that when it came to community problems,
approaches to solve them were considered “throwing money at it,” while putting money
into other aspects of society was considered a “wise investment in the future.”302 Fuller
hoped that his expansion plan could be viewed as the latter and focused his attentions on
getting it passed.
Response to the plan was divided. Mayor John Norquist opposed the plan while
the Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce endorsed it. Community opinion
ranged with some Milwaukeeans calling the plan necessary while others saw it as an
unfair burden.303 State Representative Polly Williams was one of the most vocal
opponents of the referendum, telling voters, “I am asking the voters throughout the city of
Milwaukee to unite Feb. 16 and send a message to the board of school directors that
enough is enough… Taxpayers have been giving them billions and billions of dollars
over the years and student achievement has been getting worse and worse. Not only do
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they not deserve any more money, I think we deserve a refund.”304 Attempting to show
the Milwaukee community that this referendum was a wise investment of the future
failed: in February of 1993, “an unusually high voter turnout… resulted in a resounding
defeat for Fuller’s plan by a three to one margin.”305
Fuller was quickly learning that being on the inside of MPS was not going to
allow him to continue his work of uplifting his people by fighting for access to quality
educational opportunities. He was living a lesson he had cautioned others about years
earlier; “not long after Fuller had become head of Health and Human Services,” an
acquaintance of Fuller’s “expressed some interest in working for Milwaukee County and
Fuller told him that he shouldn’t delude himself into thinkin that ‘once you get into these
positions, you’re gonna be able to change these people, because the bureaucrats won’t let
you change them. They will fight you, they will sabotage you, they will do anything in
the world just to maintain who and what they are.’”306 Fuller still chose to take the job as
superintendent, and told the Milwaukee Rotarians at the beginning of his term,
I know there are people who are saying to me, “Howard, this will never
work.” I will say to you, “It may not, but we’ll never know unless we try.”
What we do know is what we have right now is not working. And I say to
you that when we have something that is not working, don’t come to me
talking about how something else will not work… I’m telling you that this
is not going to be easy. This speech is infinitely easier than the task that’s
going to be before us on this question… There are people in our system
that believe that the system was created for their job. That they own the
jobs. Not that this belongs to the community, but that it belongs to them.
And we’re going to have to root all of that out… I know we’re going to
have to wrestle with these issues, but I guess I believe deep down in my
heart and my soul that our children are worth the effort.307
After two years on the job, however, that effort was taking its toll on Fuller.
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In an interview given in March of 1993, a month after his referendum had been
voted down, Fuller was notably pessimistic compared to interviews given over the
previous two years. When discussing his own basic problems associated with his
position, Fuller cited the fact that he did not come up through the traditional MPS ranks
as a possible weakness. While this status provided an advantage to him in that he was
never committed to anyone within system, he had to “depend a lot more on other people
for specific kinds of advice.” He also admitted that he could never “keep this kind of
professional objectivity that you sort of need to survive in this job. I let too much stuff get
to me. You can’t let every incident report that comes across your desk, for example, you
get a zillion everyday… I’m just concerned that people are starting to accept this stuff as
the way it is. I’m saying you can’t do that. We have to at least do something that says we
don’t accept this or we’re going to try to do something about it and not just let it get
woven into the urban lifestyle or whatever it is.” Fuller also discussed the fact that he was
consistently honest about what was happening. That because he never had “any kind of
careerage… I don’t want to be superintendent anywhere else,” he was willing to put
everything out in the open, making him vulnerable to attacks and criticisms.308
When assessing the referendum defeat, Fuller cited taxes as the main reason it did
not pass. Fuller claimed the tax issue was “steeped in… the ongoing issue that we’re
going to have and that’s who goes to public schools.” When asked about Polly Williams’
efforts to squash the referendum, Fuller admitted, “I think the black middle class has been
split. There’s tax issues, there’s jealousy issues, and there’s differences. I think a lot of
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the stuff for some people centers around me, my personality, who’s going to be the head
Negro in the city…Unfortunately, in our community, those personality splits have always
been and they tend to split people.”309 This sentiment is echoed in Jonathon Coleman’s
study of race in Milwaukee, where every black leader in Milwaukee seemed to have an
opinion they were willing to publicly voice about Howard Fuller. Jerrel Jones, a radio
host and prominent black in Milwaukee, did not trust Fuller because of their student days
at North Division. Jones criticized Fuller for being “a goody-two shoes who mostly hung
out with white girls.” After Fuller received the job as superintendent Jones felt “disgust
really, that whenever the city ‘needs a nigger for something, they choose Howie.’”310
James Cameron, founder of the Black Holocaust Museum in Milwaukee, disagreed with
Jones. According to Cameron,
Howard Fuller was good for all of Milwaukee… The thing of it is, the
white people put him in thinking he’s going to be a yes-man, and they’re
going to get the surprise of their life when they find out that he’s not a yesman, that they can’t control him… He’s not just there as a tokenism for
black people. I want that understood. He is somebody that Milwaukee
should be proud of. And they should work with him to help make this city
better than it is. And the only way we’re going to do it is through
education.311
Fuller’s splintered support was hindering his ability to institute real reform from the
superintendent’s chair. Fuller would have to decide if he could continue his work in that
position or have a greater effect somewhere else.
In March of 1993 Jonathan Coleman asked Fuller what the highlights were of his
first two years as superintendent. Notably disheartened, Fuller responded that, “It’s hard

309

Howard Fuller, interview by Jonathan Coleman, March 21 1993, Jonathan Coleman Papers
1976-1997, Manuscript Collection 152, Box 7, Tape 119, Golda Meir Library Archives, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 33.
310
Coleman, Long Way to Go, 56, emphasis in original.
311
Coleman, Long Way to Go, 92.

89
for me honestly to see a whole lot that I can really point to as being positive.” Fuller
expressed that turnover of superintendents was so frequent because,
Once you get into these positions, then you start running into the reality of
all the bullshit that you have to deal with. It becomes a real question, how
much you can actually do, even though you have a vision of what ought to
be done. It’s getting it done… When you get in here you just get devoured
with a whole bunch of stuff. Trying to stand above all of that, deal with it,
negotiate it but at the same time do something real… We’re still in a lot of
ways very factionalized. Maybe all cities are that way, but I know we’re
seriously that way around issues of race. For example the black
community, there’s no unity around it. There’s too many individuals that
dominate the discussion and that makes it easier it seems to me for the
white community just, “oh my god they don’t know what they want!” and
just walk away.312
Fuller suggested that if you looked at the problems on the macro level you would have to
throw your hands up and walk away. He said to survive you “gotta look at the day to day
and what you can do to make a dent in the problem.”313
As the 1993 school year began, Fuller was in charge of system with “test scores,
GPAs, dropout rates, and attendance,” which “remained unsatisfactory.”314 The
Wisconsin Policy Research Institute published a report in January of 1994 titled “Why
MPS Doesn’t Work: Barriers to Reform in the Milwaukee Public Schools.” This
document described “characteristics of effective organizations and schools… the history
of MPS reform efforts and the organizational impediments to improvements,” and argued
“that continued failure will result without fundamental change to the system.”315 The
document cited lack of school autonomy, lack of accountability, and MPS “bureaucracy
and regulation” as the reasons why MPS was failing. The report concluded that,
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Serious reform must produce accountability for results by shifting control
from MPS to those it purports to serve. This can be done by allowing
parents to choose the schools their children attend and providing them the
financial resources to do so. In the context of organizational behavior, this
is not a radical prescription for reform. Rather, it is the norm. What is
more unusual is the defense of a system demonstrating so clearly its
inability to improve performance.316
The scathing critique also asserted that, “Until MPS—with its inherent interest in
protecting the status quo and resistance to real accountability—faces external pressure
change, reform efforts will continue to fail.”317 Fuller, who had supported the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, would look to the expansion of that program to provide the
pressure that could help repair MPS. Shifting the focus of improving MPS through
outside channels rather than inside the system led to his resignation as superintendent and
mark the beginning of the rest of his life’s work as a fierce advocate for the expansion of
school choice.
Fuller’s life since he returned to Milwaukee was inextricably linked to the
advancement of his race. From the Educational Opportunities Program at Marquette, to
the Coalitions for North Division and Ernest Lacy, to Governor Earl’s administration, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and finally as superintendent of Milwaukee
Public School, Fuller took every opportunity provided to him to broaden the positive
influence he could have on his people. That sense of responsibility is the core of his
identity as a race man. When discussing the divide of blacks in Milwaukee, and the
question of what kind of responsibility blacks had to their people, Fuller told his Saturday
morning class,
I would argue that every one of you ought to get the best education you
can get, I want every one of you all to have the best quality of life that you
316
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can have for yourself as an individual. I would never argue to you you
can’t live wherever you want, but what I would say is whatever you do, if
you gain knowledge or you gain “power” I would want to argue with you
to uplift those of us who don’t have it, so that in essence I’m tying you to
the rest of the people. So I’m not allowing you then to say “I don’t have a
responsibility to them, I only have a responsibility to myself or to my
family.” That to me is what I would call a distinction between a race
person who may be doing relatively well in the society materially, and
someone who says “I’m going to get whatever I can get and as soon as I
can get away from the rest of these niggers, I’m out of here and if I don’t
see another one in life its fine with me and don’t call me if I have to do
this and that cause I don’t have to do nothing.”318
While the black community did not unanimously agree with his ideas, Fuller did not
agree with how some members of the black community approached their race either.
Fuller made decisions on how to best advance his race based on his personal experience;
continuing to use what worked and leaving behind what had not. This commitment would
continue to influence his jobs and his activism long after his term as superintendent was
over.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FROM ULTIMATE INSIDER TO ULTIMATE OUTSIDER
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) that passed into law in April of
1990 provided vouchers to 1 percent of MPS’ student population and limited their
choices to non-parochial schools.319 Milwaukee Public Schools’ continuing decline
throughout the 1990s created the impetus for reform activists to seek the expansion of
this program as well as other avenues to expand school choice. This chapter will explain
the school choice movement, with a special focus on Milwaukee and MPS. Fuller was the
superintendent of a public school system while advocating for external challenges to that
very system. His drive to effectively educate Milwaukee’s black students and his inability
to implement the change he sought within the system would return Fuller to his outsider
status. This chapter will argue that Howard Fuller’s commitment to expanding choice
opportunities for low-income black families that had been consistently let down by the
Milwaukee Public School system led him to resign as superintendent. Fuller’s
interpretation of his responsibility to the students of MPS and their best educational
opportunities rather than to MPS itself caused him to undermine the school system he
was leading. This chapter argues that his resignation was not giving up, but a refusal to
perpetuate the status quo of MPS at the detriment of the education of his people. This
chapter will follow Fuller’s activism after leaving MPS through his return to an outsider
of the system, broadening his influence and allowing him to fight for effective change.
The origins of the school choice movement can be traced back to 1955, when
“Milton Friedman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist from the University of Chicago,
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proposed vouchers as a solution to the monopoly control of the educational enterprise.”320
Viewing the public educational system as “one school district operated by one school
superintendent who reports to one school board,” Friedman argued that, “In such a
system, inefficiencies run rampant, as public school administrators have few incentives to
provide the best product at the lowest price.”321 Applying free-market economic theory to
education, this meant, “If parents can use publicly funded vouchers to cover tuition at the
school of their choice, schools will be forced to compete for paying customers and hence
will have reason to improve. Subjected to competitive pressures, the nation’s schools will
enhance productivity, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction in the services they provide,
just as the automobile, computer, banking, and retail industries have over the past several
decades.”322 Scholars have argued that applying market principles to a public good such
as education will not yield those same results. According to educational policy researcher
John F. Witte, “Supporters of choice are quick to praise competition. Make schools
compete with each other and the schools from which all families can choose will be
better. But where else has competition worked in our inner-city neighborhoods? Has it
worked in housing? In grocery stores? In heath care? In retail clothing? Most Americans
take many things for granted in their communities that cannot be taken for granted in
most inner cities in America.”323 Witte also acknowledged that this “market model of
education has been promoted as an alternative to the nineteenth-century model of
publicly defined, regulated, and assigned schools. That model significantly challenges the
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traditional institutional arrangements and is thus vigorously opposed by those dependent
on the status quo.”324 This debate between proponents of choice and those attempting to
maintain the status quo was waged in Milwaukee, with Howard Fuller leading those
ready to challenge the educational institution that had failed low-income blacks for
decades.
For reformers like Howard Fuller, school choice was a way to provide educational
opportunities for victims of poor quality public schools. According to public policy
researchers William G. Howell and Paul E. Peterson, the modern day argument for school
choice “rests primarily on its potential for equalizing educational opportunities… the
contemporary case for vouchers—as with other forms of choice—focuses on the
provision of new schooling opportunities for low-income, disadvantaged families,
especially those searching for a decent school within the inner core of major metropolitan
areas.”325 By 1990 in Milwaukee, court-mandated desegregation had not effectively
integrated the public schools. Black-nationalist reformers had recently failed in their
attempt to create an all-black school district, and “Republican governor Tommy
Thompson had introduced several voucher proposals in the legislature, only to see them
fail in the face of opposition from teachers’ unions.”326 These interests converged and
“Thompson and black leaders in Milwaukee found common ground in a law that allowed
low-income families to receive vouchers to attend private secular schools.”327 Under this
pilot voucher program,
The result was a very limited venture. To be eligible, families had to
qualify for the federal food stamp program. The amount of the voucher
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was limited to $2,500, which families could not supplement with their
own resources. Only secular private schools could participate, despite the
fact that nearly 90 percent of the private schools in the city had a religious
affiliation. No more than half of the student body attending any private
school could receive a voucher. Initially, only 1 percent of the public
school population in Milwaukee could participate in the program… If the
number of applicants to a school exceeded the number of available spaces,
the school was required to admit students by lottery.328
Fuller supported Thompson’s choice bill when he began pushing it in 1987,329 and would
continue that support throughout his superintendence.
After Fuller’s building referendum defeat, he declared he would start meeting
with “foes and allies alike” of the referendum to create a second plan for new facilities.330
According to Bill Dahlk he also, “continued to press for internal reform with several
initiatives. Mandatory algebra for all ninth graders was introduced, as was a critical
thinking component in the middle school curriculum. A lot of planning was done in
preparing for a school-to-work program that Fuller considered another key reform.”331
Fuller’s dedication to his work became clear when he was hospitalized in October of
1993 and diagnosed with sarcoidosis, a disease that is often misdiagnosed as pneumonia,
which left Fuller “running out of energy, he had a dry chronic cough and he has lost 12
pounds.”332 Despite the hospitalization and subsequent recuperation Fuller did not slow
down, and the Milwaukee Journal reported he seemed “a little skeptical that he will be
able to pull himself away from the tensions of his job.”333
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In addition to his physical ailments, Fuller had become more depressed as his
term as superintendent went on. He was realizing more and more how hard it was to
change things from inside the system. At the start of the 1993-1994 school year, Fuller
told Jonathan Coleman he was not as centered as he had been in earlier fights, for North
Division, in North Carolina, and Ernest Lacy. Fuller admitted to experiencing some
depression, which had started because of problems with the budget, and the referendum,
It was just very, very difficult. All of the symptoms of depression I think I
had. Crying. Couldn’t sleep. Couldn’t eat…It is easier to wage revolution
than it is to govern. When you’re waging revolution you got a particular
focus, you got a particular ideological perspective. Not that revolution is
easy; I’m just saying that you’re right. You know what you’re doing.
When you get in and start trying to govern, you can no longer have the
narrowest view because you got to now deal with a whole bunch of other
issues and realities… In Durham when I was younger I knew everything…
I was right and they were wrong. You’re in there fighting totally different
battles. Once you get into the system at this level, it’s a very different
situation. Stuff is a lot grayer. I don’t know if stuff is grayer because I’m
grayer or because you have to see things differently. You have to look at
where people are coming from in all of these different places.334
As it seemed the wind was being taken out of Fuller’s sails, Coleman asked if he felt
differently than when he took the job. Fuller replied, “Oh yea… I’m not totally convinced
yet that it can’t be reformed, but I’m a lot closer to thinking that than I was two years
ago, just based on personal experience.”335
As Fuller was becoming increasingly disillusioned with Milwaukee Public
Schools, he looked towards an expansion of school choice in Milwaukee through charter
schools to provide the opportunities he hoped for. Charter schools,
are public schools which receive a charter contract from a public authority
to operate for a specified period of time, to provide students a particular
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educational program and achieve specified results, often as measured by
standardized tests. Supported by President George W. Bush, former
President Clinton, and Senator John Kerry, charter schools combine the
best of public and private sector education. Like other public schools,
charters are approved by public authorities, cannot discriminate in
admissions, must offer special education, and must abide by public testing
and financial accountability requirements. Yet charter schools “reinvent”
public education, since like private schools, charters have substantial
autonomy over their personnel, curricula, and schedules. Charter teachers
and administrators are usually “at-will” employees rather than tenured
civil servants. Charters often offer unusual curricula… and nonstandard
schedules.336
In the spring of 1993, Governor Tommy Thompson proposed a budget containing “a
controversial charter school experiment” that would “allow up to 10 school districts in
the state to contract with private firms to educate children.”337 Thompson’s proposal
allowed the charter schools to be “exempt from all public education laws except
statewide assessments and school report cards,” and the Milwaukee Sentinel reported that
this proposal was drafted “because of urgings to Thompson by Milwaukee Public Schools
Superintendent Howard L. Fuller.”338 The proposal was met with immediate criticism
from both the Milwaukee Teacher’s Education Association and the Wisconsin Education
Association Council (the state’s largest teachers’ union).339 MTEA president Michael
Langyel charged that this was “not an attempt to get real school reform,” while Richard
Collins, WEAC’s president said “It’s a way of keeping employees from organizing… It’s
basically a way of privatizing education, and we have a problem with that.”340 The fact
that responses from the local and state unions focused on their employment interests
rather than the quality of education for low-income blacks helped to deepen Fuller’s
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mistrust of their commitment to the students they were hired to serve. Fuller’s
commitment to those students, and his people, are clear in his defense of the charter
school proposal and refusal to bend to the union’s demands. “The legislature passed such
a law in 1993, but it was limited: it allowed MPS to constitute only two charter schools
but they would have to be existing MPS schools and they would have to use MPS
personnel.”341 Fuller was unhappy with the limitations of the law, and began pushing for
an expansion of the charter school legislation.
Despite the union’s protestations, in January 1994 the Milwaukee School Board
approved a proposal from Fuller to “begin preliminary talks with private education firms
and other organizations promoting charter schools.”342 The Milwaukee Journal reported
that while School Board members were “skeptical about allowing private businesses into
MPS,” the “grim outlook for education financing” pushed them to keep an open mind.343
The board’s decision sparked a debate in Milwaukee; with the MTEA staunchly opposed
to charter schools while the community seemed intrigued by their possibility. In one
editorial from the Milwaukee Journal, the MTEA is accused of the union’s top priority
being “to win the right of teachers to move to the suburbs” rather than their students’ best
interest.344 Another cites the “hang-up” of charter schools in the legislature “is by and
large the Democrats, who are just too beholden to teacher unions. The Milwaukee
union…is leading MPS over the cliff into oblivion. Milwaukee Democrats had best
unhitch their wagon from that horse. Instead of pushing reform, MTEA uses it as a
bargaining chip… The Democrats must now put children not narrow-minded unions first.
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Otherwise, they may be tagged as the party fighting school innovation.”345 One MTEA
teacher, Chuck Howard, responded to these criticisms in an op-ed piece explaining the
many problems associated with MPS students and the difficulties in providing quality
education to those living in poverty. He argued,
As educators in public schools, we see private charter schools as
abandonment, not reform. Turning MPS students over to for-profit
companies that can use underpaid, non-licensed, less-qualified teachers
for experiments in turning around “failed” schools is not innovative, it is
illogical. Blaming a public school faculty for not overcoming all of the
social problems facing students is simplistic scapegoating.346
Howard failed to acknowledge that having well-paid, licensed, qualified teachers had not
worked for these students, and instead showed an unwillingness to change the status quo.
Howard Fuller was not silent during this debate, telling the Milwaukee Sentinel
that, “if the board insists he continue to work within the existing system… he may not be
the right person for the job.” He explained that, “If I can’t get anything at all that I think
is needed to change the system, then why would I be here? Then it would mean that you
need another kind of person… who is more oriented to managing what is… I’m not
oriented toward managing ‘what is’ because I don’t think ‘what is’ is going to bring
about the level of changes that we need for our children.”347 Fuller did not view his
position as superintendent of MPS as beholding him to that system. His job was to
provide the best education possible for students attending MPS. Fuller’s experience in the
job for two and a half years forced him to face the possibility that the best education may
be from outside of the system. In March of 1994, the state legislature would take away
this possibility by rejecting his plan to “expand the parameters of the charter schools.”
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Fuller rejected this setback and told reporters he was “not going to accept this,” and that
he intended to keep pressing forward with expanding the charter school initiative.348
Charter schools had the power to expand educational options for Milwaukee
blacks, and the potential to arm parents with a choice of where to send their children.
Charter proponents argued that allowing parents to act as customers in an educational
market would increase competition, therefore increasing overall quality. This free-market
association has often framed school choice as a “right-wing attack on public
education.”349 These partisan politics have had a detrimental effect on school choice.
According to Frances C. Fowler, an Educational Leadership professor at Miami
University in Ohio, the school choice debate is “easily the most controversial educational
policy issue of our time. Its supporters who are mostly, but not entirely, political
conservatives—usually advocate school choice as a way to use competition to encourage
public schools to improve. Its opponents—who are mostly, but not entirely, political
liberals—usually argue against it because they fear that it will increase segregation by
race and social class while transforming the public school system into a dumping ground
for the students who are the most difficult to educate.”350 The strong correlation between
school choice and political affiliation has stifled the ability of choice to be effectively
tried as an answer to urban educational problems. With individuals in both the
community and the government feeling beholden to partisan commitments, there is less
impetus to give choice options a try. These types of commitments explain why Fuller
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does not identify with any political party. For him, what is important are the steps being
taken to provide education to his people, regardless of which political party are pushing
them.
The elections held in November of 1994 for the state legislature tipped the
partisan scale in favor of Fuller and the proponents of school choice, “In addition to the
governor’s office, Republicans now control both houses of the Legislature… with the
state’s largest teacher’s union now in a weaker position Republicans could ease the way
for some of Milwaukee Superintendent Howard Fuller’s overdue reforms, such as
loosening regressive regulations and permitting real charter schools.”351 Black
educational activists like Howard Fuller and state assemblywoman Polly Williams used
this shift to call on black Milwaukeeans to “take more control of education reform.”352
Despite their differences regarding the building referendum the previous year, Williams
and Fuller’s interests converged around the issue of choice. This alliance would help
garner support for the choice movement from Milwaukee’s black community for years,
an opportunity both activists could not ignore. Around this same time, a report of school
costs in metropolitan Milwaukee “found that public schools spend more than twice as
much money for each pupil than private schools,” with “higher salaries for teachers and
other professionals” accounting for half of that difference.353 This report, combined with
the call for increased black activism created more black community support for Fuller
and expanding choice and less sympathy for the MTEA. Fuller looked towards the 1995
school board elections as a chance to gain support for his charter initiative, while
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Governor Thompson used the increased support to put forth a more aggressive plan to
expand Milwaukee’s voucher program in 1996. Thompson’s plan introduced the
controversial idea of expanding Milwaukee’s voucher program to include religious
schools.354
The debate that had been raging about the possibility of expanding school choice
in Milwaukee intensified when the proposal made by Thompson made these possibilities
a reality. Thompson’s willingness to have religious schools among voucher recipients, as
well as sites for new charter schools challenged the important separation between church
and state. His proposal doubling the number of students that could participate in the
existing voucher system also intensified the debate,355 making privatization the
battleground for the school board elections in April of 1995. While the MTEA stood firm
in their opposition of any privatization, Fuller sought to make his opinion clear before the
elections, telling the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “I have never proposed
‘privatization’… We have looked at contracting out facilities and services. The big lie
that is being told is that I’m interested in privatizing the [whole] system. It’s a big smoke
screen.”356 After the School Board elections, candidates backed by the teachers union “on
an anti-privatization platform” filled four of the five open seats.357 For Fuller, the
elections proved he would be working with a school board interested in maintaining the
status quo. As Fuller had told the Milwaukee Journal months earlier, if that was the goal,
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he was not the right man for the job. Staying true to his word, in April 1995 Howard
Fuller resigned as superintendent of MPS.
Fuller, and MPS, were praised by Business Week in April of 1995 as being
“among the most aggressive systems over-hauling American urban education,” with
Fuller “helping principals and teachers break free of suffocating rules imposed by state
and city bureaucrats.”358 The magazine was not alone in its accolades, with educational
professors and researchers also praising the innovations Fuller had implemented in the
system. In the wake of Fuller’s resignation, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel ran an article
summarizing Fuller’s initiatives including: experiments with privatization, school-towork programs, algebra requirements, curriculum, and accountability.359 In Fuller’s
resignation statement, he reinforced his commitment to the students of MPS and cited
union desires to keep up the status quo as the reason he could not continue the job:
For all of my adult life in Milwaukee, every fiber of my being has been
devoted to helping this community’s children achieve a better future. This
will always be the agenda that guides me. It is a tribute to the resiliency
and intelligence of the children and parents of Milwaukee that they have
done as well as they have in spite of the neglect they have suffered. It is a
tribute to the dedication of thousands of splendid individual educators and
support staff in the Milwaukee Public Schools that they have done so
much for our children, in spite of the self-serving vision of their purported
“representatives.” We have heard from these “representatives”—those
who protect the forces of the status quo—that Howard Fuller wants to sell
out our children to “privatization.” We have heard about my supposedly
“secret agenda.” We have heard that I am in the hip pocket of the
“downtown business interests.” Indeed these were the scurrilous messages
the Milwaukee Teachers’ Education Association… spread during the
recent school Board campaign. These charges reflect the central strategy
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of defenders of the status quo: smear any effort to bring genuine reform to
the system as a “plot” to destroy public education.360
His idea that defenders of the status quo would smear efforts to bring reform would
influence the next stage of Fuller’s activism. He would set out to dispel what he saw as
lies and distortions in the media about school vouchers and other avenues for choice.
Fuller continued his speech, echoing his commitment to the children of the system
and exposing those who had their own self-interest in mind,
Let me be blunt. Too often in the last several years, our children have
suffered under the yoke of these powerful forces. The events of the last
several months have created a more detrimental political environment,
which now threatens to reverse the momentum we need to make major
change. I now believe I will be maneuvered into a position where I would
be expected to become a bureaucrat protecting the status quo, while the
public is led to believe that true reform is under way… The district cannot
succeed if the primary question, day-after-day, week-after-week, is
whether the superintendent can “patch together five votes” to support the
many actions that will be necessary to carry out a rigorous reform
agenda… Let me emphasize… that for me and for all of us who are totally
committed to our children… the words of William Daggett will continue
to guide us: We must love our children’s hopes, dreams, and prayers more
than we love the institutional heritage of the school system.361
Fuller choked up and wiped away tears when talking to reporters after his speech, saying,
“This is not just a professional matter, it’s a personal matter.”362 Fuller’s exit from the
school system allowed him to return to his outsider status. He would use this position as
he had in the past, and become a national leader of those interested in reforming
education for blacks. In her dissertation discussing the leadership of Howard Fuller,
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Jeanette Mitchell said that the evening Fuller resigned “resulted in unleashing one of the
key leaders in the battle for education reform and choice in the country.”363
Fuller’s time as superintendent made him more committed to the idea that radical
change was necessary to tangibly improve educational opportunities for low-income
blacks in Milwaukee. When Mitchell asked Fuller what fueled “this idea, he said that his
MPS experience had given him a greater appreciation for how hard it was [to change],
but at the same time had given him a greater understanding of how [the bureaucracy]
will never work for our children.”364 Fuller’s commitment to those children was his
life’s work, and that commitment to his work rather than any particular job was the
driving force behind his resignation. Explaining his history of job hopping, Fuller told
Mitchell,
People [who care] sometimes don’t understand why I make shifts in my
jobs. I stay in a job as long as I am effective. There are many ways to
create and “do” your vision. I separate job and work. My work is my
purpose. I look for ways to pursue my work, but jobs can be different.
Other people see jobs and work as the same. I don’t. There is danger in
getting fixed and not being fluid enough to pursue your work in whatever
venue.365
Fuller told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (MJS) that he wanted to stay in Milwaukee
and continue working for education reform, but that, “he wasn’t interested in working for
the state, or seeking another urban superintendency.”366 The MJS also reported that,
“Because he will no longer have to worry about the agenda of the Milwaukee Teachers
Education Association, or answer to a School Board divided in its support of his reform
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efforts, Fuller may more candidly and aggressively advocate his own ideas for improving
the way Milwaukee children are educated.”367 To determine his next step, Fuller “called
together a group of supporters from the community and the school system to discuss his
departure and weigh the options for his future.”368 According to Mitchell, “This
collaborative process produced the Institute for the Transformation of Learning at
Marquette University (The Institute). It was noted that the words ‘change and reform’
were not used in the title nor was ‘schools or schooling.’ Transformation, according to
one supporter, was the forming of the mind to embrace material and data, to decipher and
decode complex matter, and to do so in a supportive environment. Learning was selected
because it was more comprehensive than education.”369 Fuller began holding meetings to
discuss the Institute, known as “Explorations.” According to Mitchell, the first meeting
“included business people, school administrators, teachers, both public and private,
people from higher education, both public and private, parents, young adults, foundation
people, suburban people all races, genders, and income levels and even representatives
from the teachers’ union.”370
Marquette University hired Fuller to teach and direct the Institute in June of 1995.
According to Fuller, the Institute would “Play a role in assuring the success of reforms
that are emerging in the state Legislature… Support serious reforms in existing
educational institutions, most notably at MPS,” and “Support neighborhood-based efforts
that give children the help they need to succeed.”371 In the state legislature during this
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time, Governor Tommy Thompson was pushing for an expansion of the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program. According to Bill Dahlk, along with those who had supported
the initial Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, “additional interests began to lay
groundwork for an Expanded Choice program after the bill’s passage.”372 Dahlk cites the
Milwaukee Archdiocese and members of Milwaukee’s business community as supporters
of expanding choice, the former looking to improve their schools’ enrollment and
financing and the latter interested in developing a local, competent work force.373 In July
of 1995, Fuller co-wrote a study he hoped would help influence the legislature’s decision
on the Expanded Choice bill. Fuller told MJS that by writing the report, “he was trying to
debunk the notion being advanced by choice detractors that expansion of the program
would ultimately hurt low-income and minority children by siphoning money from the
public schools they attend.” The Journal Sentinel reported that, “Choice critics… fear
that legislators will eventually be pressured to strip screening restrictions and income
limits from the program, leaving the public schools to fend for themselves with the
students who are hardest to educate.” Fuller responded to that notion saying, “That line of
thinking prevents you from doing anything… I would argue vociferously against any
effort to expand choice beyond the needs of low-income people. Such a strategy would
defeat the reason why we fought for choice.”374 Fuller’s report showed that while 21% of
Milwaukee parents chose private schools, only 7% of children in the poorest
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neighborhoods used private schools “compared to 30% in the rest of the city and 33%
among [children of] public school teachers.”375
The debate waged in Milwaukee was on the leading edge of the national debate
on school choice that continues today. Because of the political implications of the issue,
however, it is difficult to find an informed opinion that is not directly attempting to
support one side or the other. Fowler recognizes that school choice has always been
available for those with sufficient means (moving into a better school district, choosing a
private school option), while the traditional system locks in those families that are less
than well off. For Fowler, the debate centers around, “the nature of human beings and
society, the purpose of education, the right of parents to make crucial decisions about the
welfare of their children, religious freedom, and the social prerequisites of
democracy.”376 These issues range from personal to national contexts, and regards policy
that very directly affects people’s life chances, naturally invoking passionate responses.
The debate is heated, but according to Fowler, research findings have not helped resolve
it: “Rather, sharply different results and arguments between researchers have served to
intensify it.”377 Governor Tommy Thompson looked to the Republican legislature to pass
the Expanded Choice bill, and “in his State of the State address in January 1995,”
discussed his support of choice:
School choice is more than a program… it is a philosophy. It is a belief
that parents know best when it comes to their own children… It is a belief
that poor parents have the same rights to choose that other parents do… It
is the belief that parents will choose the best school for their child. That’s
education serving the public. We are expanding our Milwaukee private
school choice program to include more children and all private schools. If
a mother in Milwaukee wants her child to walk to the private school
375

Ibid.
Fowler, 5.
377
Ibid., 1.
376

109
across the street instead of being bused to public school across town… she
is going to have that choice. If that private school across the street has a
religious affiliation… she still is going to have that choice. Religious
values are not the problem, drop-out rates are.378
While the focus of academic achievement has become central to much of the
debate around school choice, the importance of arming parents with a choice and
allowing them to choose a schooling environment that best fits their situation cannot be
overlooked. These choices not directly resulting in higher achievement, however, has
allowed choice critics to devalue the importance of choice itself. According to Urban
Education professor Michelle Fine, discussing choice and charter options and their effects
on students,
Small . . . will produce a sense of belonging almost immediately, but
hugging is not the same as algebra. Rigor and care must be braided
together, or we run the risk of creating small, nurturing environments that
aren’t schools. Keeping kids connected to schools and schooling is critical,
but ultimately it’s merely a means to a larger end—high standards of
student achievement. Ultimately, the first priority of every school must be
to stretch students academically to prepare them for the academic rigors of
college.379
Fine does not acknowledge the possibility that parents choosing these schools have a
greater need for a small, supportive environment to help their children reach their
potential, rather than a rigorous educational setting focused on preparing them for
college. While the debate on school choice is intense and heated, it must recognize the
population whose educational chances it seeks to improve, and broaden its goals beyond
preparing students for college.
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State lawmakers voted in Thompson’s favor and “agreed to expand the program
to 15,000 students and to open eligibility to religious schools.”380 Those changes,
however, were appealed by the MTEA and the American Civil Liberties Union and were
tied up in courts until June of 1998, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided 4-2 in
favor of the proposal.381 Debate over choice, however, was not over, and many people
would look exclusively to the academic achievement of choice students as the criterion
for whether or not the program was successful. But for reformers and activists like Fuller,
the academic performance was not the only indicator of success. Arming parents with the
empowerment of choice was an integral part of the expansion of choice. And giving lowincome blacks the same choices affluent whites had always had with choice was a way of
leveling the playing field in one of the most segregated cities in the country.
Using the Institute for the Transformation of Learning as a base, Fuller set out to
expand the conversation about education empowerment for low-income blacks beyond
Milwaukee. After successfully advocating for the expansion of choice and providing
resources for families seeking choice in Milwaukee, Fuller felt he could have even more
influence on the education of low-income blacks if he brought his message around the
country. In 2000, Fuller founded the Black Alliance for Educational Options (BAEO) to
continue his work. When Jeanette Mitchell asked Fuller why he started BAEO, Fuller
said,
The specific motivation was as I was being invited to speak around the
country at charter school association meetings, at conferences where the
issue of choice was being discussed, whether it was charters or vouchers
or whatever, what was really interesting to me was that most of those
rooms were full of white people, and the discussion was invariably about
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programs that were going to impact children of color and African
American children in particular. So I remember getting up and saying at
one of those meetings that there was no way that this battle could be won
if the room did not change, if we did not have more African American
people and, I believe Hispanic people and other people of color involved
in the movement.382
Fuller again called together a diverse group of individuals to brainstorm ideas, which
coalesced at “a meeting in December 1999 in Washington D.C. of African Americans
who had attended the first symposium, as well as others who had been ‘recruited’ as they
traveled around the country… According to Fuller, this was the founding meeting for
BAEO.”383 A year after their meeting in Washington, the BAEO board scheduled a
retreat in Milwaukee. By Mitchell’s account, at the meeting,
Much time was spent detailing the types of options BAEO would support.
The discussion led to Fuller’s explanation of the “essence of coalition
politics.” The base of the discussion was grounded in the tenuous coalition
between BAEO and the “power broker-white conservatives.” Everyone on
both sides recognized that the glue for the coalition was Howard Fuller…
He [Fuller] explained the ultimate goal of the “white power broker
conservatives” was universal vouchers… He pointed out, moving into his
passionate mode, having something started out by us (Blacks) to get
turned on its head later is not new. He (Fuller) would resist that with all
his power, and fight to make sure it never happens. He clearly articulated
the line in the sand, “We will not take money and promote a cause that is
not ours... We will not have people with money control us when we are
not on the same page. I’d rather be poor and fighting for our cause, than
support universal vouchers.384
Critics of Fuller may question how a former Black Panther, seemingly liberal
nationalist activist could join forces with an oppressive group he had been fighting
against his whole life. One BAEO board member explained this contradiction:
So the average person, who doesn’t deal with educational politics from
day to day, they might not really even know about it [Choice]… they feel
like the Republican party and its conservative right-wing agenda is in
382
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control of this movement, and they’re afraid to invest their energies into
that because… we’ve placed ourselves as fighting against that. So how do
you join somebody who you’ve been fighting against your entire life?...
that’s a real question that we’ve got to answer… So that’s why I think
BAEO becoming [sic] a force that educates parents, that educates families
and educates policy-makers, it gives us an opportunity to combat that
perception.385
Another board member defended the alliance saying, “We’re not going to keep any
permanent partners, like Howard says, in this fight. We are going to just have common
issues. But if the white conservative agenda is going to benefit our kids for even a
passing moment of opportunity, we have an obligation as black educational advocates to
get as many of our kids through that window of opportunity before it closes.”386 Fuller
used the creation of both the Institute for the Transformation of Learning and the Black
Alliance for Educational Options to continue his work of providing access to quality
education for low-income blacks. Another way he continued this fight was with his
writings. Fuller used his position at Marquette, his reputation as a community activist,
and his newfound respect as former superintendent to voice his opinion publicly about
choice. Writing primarily to break down what he saw as “lies and distortions” about
school choice programs put forth by powerful teachers union lobbies, Fuller vociferously
defends choice programs as effectively empowering low-income families and improving
educational opportunities for their children.
The issue of choice, like other school reform movements, is much more
complicated and diverse than typical debates, scholarship, or media representations
expose. In the 21st century, “politics around school issues is looking more and more like
politics around other domestic policy issues such as housing, welfare, social services, and
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community development. The changes that seem dramatic within the local education
sphere in most respects are old hat in American politics more generally, including at the
local level.”387 A view that has been typically heralded by conservatives is that public
education has long acted “more as a piggy-bank for jobs and other forms of patronage
than as an engine for serious investment in human capital and for closing achievement
gaps.”388 Regardless of political affiliation, increasing frustration with underachieving
schools (high drop-out rates, low GPAs, low test scores, etc.) has created support for the
choice movement from both sides. While both Democrats and Republicans have
supported charter schools, voucher programs tend to be more controversial and seen as a
more radical market approach to education: “charter politics are galvanized by different
motives and policy frames that create strange political coalitions. Charter schools could
easily be called the ‘all things to all people’ reform.”389 Because the politics surrounding
the issue are so tense, especially because of the possible implication expanding choice
has on the power of teachers’ unions, it is difficult to read reports about choice that go
unchallenged. And although many states have started charter programs, many people still
are not even sure what charter schools are. For Fuller, what was important about the issue
was spreading information about it. He sought to provide accurate information to families
seeking choice, and empower them simply by providing that choice. As was his approach
in the Department of Employment Relations, as the head of the Department of Health and
Human Services, and as superintendent, Fuller wanted to be honest about choice issues,
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because he believed “no matter what it is, you have to tell the truth… You have to get
people to face up to what is the reality in order to make a change.”390
In 1999, a year after the Expanded Choice bill was deemed constitutional by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Fuller began publishing information about Milwaukee and its
choice program to dispel criticisms and uncover the “lies and distortions”391 he believed
were being accepted by the media and subsequently, the public. In March of 1999, Fuller
partnered with MPS educational researcher George Mitchell and wrote “The Fiscal
Impact of School Choice and the Milwaukee Public Schools” in response to “predictions
that it would have a severe and unfair fiscal impact on the Milwaukee Public Schools.”392
Fuller and Mitchell used budgetary information from MPS to examine “changes in state
aid to MPS and in overall MPS spending,” and found that in the nine years that the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was in effect, “real state aid per pupil” had
increased by 43 percent.393 The authors also disputed a claim made by the Institute for
Wisconsin’s Future that MPS “would experience a net [state aid] loss of $22.2 million in
1998-1999,” instead arguing that “when adjusted for inflation, state aid to MPS grew
1.4%.”394 Educational researcher Frederick M. Hess discussing the debate of this fiscal
impact said, “Regardless of the relative merits of these claims, the salient point… is the
reluctance of voucher proponents to forcefully argue that the MPS ought to be financially
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penalized for losing students.”395 As Fuller and Mitchell did not make this argument, but
instead showed just the information about the MPCP’s impact, they demonstrated that
Fuller was interested first and foremost with getting accurate, honest information about
choice to the public, information he hoped would garner support for choice.
In December 1999, Fuller and Mitchell looked to dispel more negative choice
criticisms in “The Impact of School Choice on Racial and Ethnic Enrollment in
Milwaukee Private Schools.”396 In this article, the authors cited the NAACP as arguing “a
natural and foreseeable consequence [of the expanded choice program] will be… further
segregation of the schools [in Milwaukee].”397 Fuller and Mitchell argued that rather than
increasing isolation, choice caused a “notable increase in racial balance in Milwaukee
private schools” because “most low-income students using school vouchers… belong to
racial or ethnic minorities. In using the choice program, they have moved from racially
isolated public schools with a low percentage of white students, to systems of private
schools with a larger enrollment of white students. This has led to more integrated private
school systems.”398 While Fuller had made it clear throughout his years of activism in
Milwaukee that integration was not important to him, it was still a key issue for other
reform activists, making it important to dispel the argument that choice had increased
segregation. Comparing Minority and White enrollment by percentages in public schools
from before the Expanded Choice bill and after, the authors successfully showed that
schools were becoming less racially isolated as a result of choice. The following tables
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were provided, including actual White and Minority enrollment before and after choice
expansions, and the estimated percentages (estimated using previous demographic trends)
without those expansions:
Minority and White Enrollment, By %, Private Schools, 1998-99 v. 1994-95.399
Minority
1994-95 (actual, before
27.4% (n = 7,631)
expansion)
1998-99 (actual, with choice 35.7% (n = 9,718)
expansion)
1998-99 (estimated, without 26.9% (n = 5,858)
expansion)

White
72.6% (n = 20,185)
64.3% (n = 17,490)
73.1% (n = 15, 958)

Minority and White Enrollment, By %, Public Schools, 1998-99 v. 1994-95.400

1994-95 (actual, before
expansion)
1998-99 (actual, with choice
expansion)
1998-99 (estimated, without
expansion)

Minority

White

77.6% (n = 82,916)

22.4% (n = 23, 951)

81.5% (n = 91,468)

18.5% (n = 20,700)

81.1% (n = 95, 328)

18.9% (n = 22, 232)

Fuller and Mitchell put out a similar report again after the following school year, which
reinforced their claims. They also acknowledged that, “The purpose of this report… is
neither to elevate nor diminish the importance of integration. Rather, its sole purpose is to
respond factually to claims by voucher opponents that school choice increases
segregation.”401 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel responded to the report, declaring that,
“a year after the expansion of choice to religious schools, the racial tally is in. And—
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drumroll please—the critics are wrong. The program has enhanced diversity among the
city’s students.”402
Fuller’s frustrations with MPCP critics came together in a paper he co-wrote for
the Second Annual Symposium on Educational Options for African Americans with the
Black Alliance for Educational Options on March 2-5, 2000. Fuller and Kaleem Claire,
another BAEO member, discussed “four common examples of Big Lies are that existing
voucher programs,”
•
•
•
•

Use selective admission practices to “cream” the “best” students.
Do not serve students with special learning needs.
Will “destroy” public education.
Do not improve the academic achievement of voucher students.403

Fuller and Mitchell wrote an article in January of 2000 disputing the first two “big lies”
he identified for the Symposium. The authors disputed the first claim with the fact that,
“state law prohibits private schools from using any criteria for MPCP-eligible
students.”404 The authors disputed the second claim by explaining the process parents of
special needs students go through in MPS:
MPS’ school directory says, “When children with special needs select a
school/program where their individual needs cannot be appropriately met
[i.e., an “Inappropriate School Choice”], parents will be contacted by
special education supervisors to discuss options at other schools…” MPS
has the final say, not the parent, in determining where a special needs
student attends school, including whether the student may attend a school
that does not have a program for them. This is not so with MPCP schools,
which, as with MPS schools, do not have programs for all special needs
students. While an MPCP school may advise a parent that the school does
402
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not have a specific program, under state law the decision to attend the
school is the parent’s, not the school’s.405
The third “big lie” the Fuller and Claire identified was that voucher programs
would destroy public education. They introduced an opinion of public education that
challenged the status quo: “it is our belief that public education is a concept and that
government-owned and government-operated schools represent but one way of delivering
public education. As shown at the postsecondary level, there are many ways to provide
public education beyond high school. The same is so in grades K-12, where society is
choosing an increasing variety of ways to organize schools that deliver ‘public
education.’”406 Fuller and Claire cited research that MPS had responded to the new
competition by trying to reshape their programs and become more appealing to parents.
The Superintendent of MPS, Spence Korte, was interviewed in January of 2001 on
Wisconsin Public Television and agreed that MPS was trying to be more competitive,
“Like many other monopolistic operations, you get a little bit complacent when you’re
the only game in town… We are dedicating ourselves to make sure that public schools
know how to reach out and know how to serve families and we’re the local place for
people to start for their educational programs. We hope they’ll give us a good look.”407
For Fuller, who had always pushed the need for more accountability in public schools,
this was a clear victory. Anything that made MPS strive to be better should have a
positive impact on the students it had traditionally underserved.
The final “lie” Fuller and Claire challenged was the criticism that voucher
programs did not improve the academic achievement of voucher students. While not
405
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taking into account the empowerment students and parents feel by having more choice in
their educational options, voucher opponents have argued that choice programs do not
raise student achievement. Fuller and Claire explored the validity of this claim rather than
arguing the importance the empowerment of choice provides. According to the authors,
in 1999 the National Educators Association claimed, “There is no evidence that vouchers
improve student learning. Every serious study of voucher plans concludes that vouchers
don’t improve student achievement.”408 Citing research done by Harvard education
researchers, Fuller and Claire presented the findings that,
Researchers who have served as evaluators of the publicly-funded choice
programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland as well as the privately-funded
programs in Washington, D.C., Dayton, New York, and San Antonio
agree that these programs have been generally positive developments and
have supported their continuation if not expansion. If one only examined
the competing interest group and research community spin on the various
evaluations instead of reading the evaluations themselves one might easily
miss the level of positive consensus that exists. This positive consensus is
all the more remarkable given the politically contentious nature of the
issue and the rewards scholars have for highlighting disagreements with
one another. [Yet] there is largely agreement among the researchers who
have collected and analyzed the flood of new data on school choice that
these programs are generally positive in their effects and ought to be
continued if not expanded.409
Fuller and Claire presented information directly related to four distortions they had found
in the media regarding school choice. The authors made it clear that their priority was
providing the information that countered those claims, and then used that information to
advocate for choice. Fuller’s commitment to uplifting his race is clear in his commitment
to providing them information, and trusting them to make their own decisions.
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Howard Fuller has been an influential voice for choice politics on a national level.
As of 2004, Fuller had started chapters of the Black Alliance of Educational Options
(BAEO) “in 20 states and the District of Columbia.”410 Choice programs in Milwaukee,
which were implemented and supported by Fuller, have helped lay the foundation for
similar programs in Ohio, Florida, Texas, and New York.411 Fuller’s actions as MPS
superintendent gave him national attention as a pioneer willing to take risks to create
reform in failing school systems. As a result, George W. Bush asked Fuller to serve as an
advisor during his first presidential campaign.412 The National Journal reported that
when governor, Bush requested a meeting with Fuller when he was speaking in Austin,
Texas on behalf of BAEO in 1999. During the meeting,
They discussed vouchers and charter schools (public schools with few
regulations imposed from above) and the importance of supporting people
working to change public education. Fuller, who was instrumental in
implementing Milwaukee's voucher program when he took the
superintendent's job in 1991, is a strong advocate of vouchers for children
from low-income families. The Milwaukee program now gives these
children $4,400 apiece in taxpayer dollars to attend private schools,
including religious ones. But Fuller said his top goal is trying to make sure
kids learn, and Bush convinced Fuller that was his goal, too. “This is not a
line that should divide liberals and conservatives,” Fuller said.413
As a result of this meeting, Fuller became one of thirteen special education
advisors for George W. Bush. During his first term in the Oval Office, Bush implemented
the No Child Left Behind act (NCLB), which “creates pressure on districts (and states) to
410
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provide much tighter oversight of individual school performance—and to deploy charter
schools as an option for youngsters otherwise mired in low-performing district-operated
schools.”414 Being such an influential voice for the country’s first voucher program
provided opportunities for Fuller to influence voucher and choice expansion from coast to
coast. His activism after his time as superintendent thrust him into the national spotlight
as an advocate for choice, broadening his influential role as a champion for low-income
blacks everywhere.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
After his time as superintendent, Fuller used his outsider status to get information
out about and advocate for school choice programs. Through the Institute for the
Transformation of Learning and the Black Alliance for Educational Options, Fuller
challenged powerful bureaucracies he saw putting their self-interest over their
responsibility to Milwaukee’s underserved children. Fuller and Milwaukee education
researcher George Mitchell came together again in 2006 to write an article where they
“concluded that collective bargaining is taking public education in an unsustainable
direction,”415 and argued, “The monopoly status of public education has insulated it from
the difficult adjustments occurring in most other sectors of the economy, including many
sectors that rely on unionized labor.”416 Fuller and Mitchell also declared, “Eventually, in
our view, there will be insufficient public support and capacity for continuing a system
that uses more and more resources without commensurate results.”417
It seems that day has come. While the public’s frustration with the powerful
teachers’ union in Wisconsin came to a head in Spring 2011, the public and governor
were not shy in airing their grievances with a powerful bureaucracy that refused
compromise. While the language around collective bargaining rights focused on teachers
and what they deserved, the discussion of the students they were hired to serve was
secondary. This is what Howard Fuller has been fighting against his whole life. His desire
to make these children a focus by providing them access to quality educational
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opportunities has guided nearly every professional decision he has made throughout his
life. His ability to navigate different worlds and power structures has led him to a
spectrum of positions allowing him to advance his race. Refusing to stay at a job once he
has become ineffective, Fuller is not satisfied unless he is truly working to uplift and
liberate his people, the work and purpose of a race man.
Howard Fuller has continuously demonstrated that he will work with anyone who
shares his goal of uplifting black children by providing them access to quality education.
This is clear through numerous instances where interest convergence has brought Fuller
together with unlikely allies. The Milwaukee Archdiocese saw choice as an opportunity
to counter declining enrollment rates in Milwaukee’s parochial schools. Milwaukee’s
business community, concerned about the lack of a local, competent workforce, also saw
choice as an opportunity to address their problem. Finally, white conservatives supported
choice with an eventual goal of providing universal vouchers in Milwaukee and its
surrounding suburbs. Howard Fuller used all of these instances to push his choice agenda,
using windows of opportunity provided by these groups to improve educational
opportunities for low-income blacks. Educational researcher T.C. Pedroni notes that
these periods of interest convergence suggest “that this coalition of ‘strange bedfellows’
must compel progressive educational scholars and activists alike to rethink their current
stance on claiming that these progressive Black voucher advocates are merely passive
pawns of White conservative forces.”418 Fuller has done an incredible job of using
interest convergence to advance his goals, without allowing those he has converged with
to supersede his cause. He also has kept no permanent partners. This became clear in
418

T.C. Pedroni, quoted in Thandeka K Chapman and René Antrop-González, “A Critical Look at
Choice Options as Solutions to Milwaukee’s Schooling Inequities,” Teachers College Record vol. 113, no.
4 (April 2011): 797.

124
Spring 2011 when Wisconsin governor Scott Walker sought to “eliminate income limits
in Milwaukee's school choice program, allowing the children of middle-income and
wealthy people to attend private schools at taxpayer expense.”419 Fuller, who had
vehemently fought for school choice with those who were now seeking to remove the
income limit, stood strong in his stance and echoed previous statements saying, “I do not
support universal vouchers wherever they put it…I still believe the focus of these
programs should be on low-income and working-class people."420 When Fuller testified
in front of the State Assembly about the proposed change, he referred to it as “egregious”
and “outrageous.” He also told reporters after he testified that, “This is where I get off the
train.”421 While the choice coalition of Fuller and white power brokers in Milwaukee is
diverging, Fuller’s response to this change and his unwillingness to budge should not
come as a surprise. In examining Fuller’s life, he has repeatedly worked a job, or fought a
fight until it was no longer effective. Fuller told Jeanette Mitchell in September of 2001
that, “I don’t think organizations are to necessarily last. It depends on whether or not
they’re still serving a function.”422 This idea, and its extension to not only organizations,
but philosophies and allies is the most important thing we can learn from Howard Fuller.
Fuller has demonstrated his commitment to the education of low-income blacks
through his pragmatic view of racial integration. While Fuller has demonstrated
integrating schools is secondary in his activism to providing quality education, he has
conjoined these opportunities when necessary. While some parents value an integrated
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learning environment for their children, Education professors Chapman and AntropGonzález argue, “White people are willing to live and learn with a small percentage of
people of color or poor people, as shown by the success of the Chapter 220 program,
which allows small numbers of students of color to enter suburban schools; however,
there is a limit to the percentage they see as valued and not detrimental.” Chapman and
Antrop-González also argue that situations where choice pushes that threshold may be a
factor in subsequent white (and middle-class black) flight. 423 In Durham, Fuller gained
the understanding that the mere mixing of bodies in schools did not make meaningful,
integrated learning environments. For him, choice is supposed to cater to those lowincome black students regardless of who is then willing to attend school with them.
Through his approaches to integration, Fuller reinforces that no cause will ever supersede
his own goal, regardless of how this goal affects the appeal of choice schools to others.
Fuller’s ability to evolve his thinking and subsequently, his actions has made him
a community activist and leader who effectively gets things done. Whether you agree
with his ideas or not, Fuller’s ability to navigate different situations and make the most of
any window of opportunity available to him in order to achieve his goals has made him
effective, powerful, and influential. His unwillingness to be beholden to his previous
philosophies and former battles opens up possibilities for reform and change other
activists and leaders deny themselves. It is the belief of this author that if a better
alternative was offered to provide quality educational opportunities to low-income blacks
than school choice, Howard Fuller would support it. Regardless of his status as a national
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advocate for choice, regardless of his own position as board chair of a Milwaukee charter
school; if he saw a better way, he would work for it. If this new way forced him to ally
with Michael McGee, Polly Williams, or Scott Walker, he would fight for it. If more
people with the same kind of influence as Fuller had that conviction, allowing them to
focus on their goals rather than who is behind them, reforms in urban education are only
the tip of the iceberg for the positive changes that could occur.
In early 2012 Howard Fuller resumed his chairmanship of the Black Alliance for
Educational Options while teaching at Marquette University and directing the Institution
for the Transformation of Learning. According to the National BAEO website, Fuller is
also currently,
Chair of the Board of the Wisconsin Municipalities Private School
Finance Commission, the Alliance for Choices in Education in
Milwaukee, and CEO Leadership Academy. He also serves on the Board
of Directors of Transcenter for Youth, the Johnson Foundation, the Big
Picture Company, the Joyce Foundation, School Choice Wisconsin,
Advocates for School Choice, the National Alliance of Public Charter
Schools, The Charter School Review Committee for the City of
Milwaukee, and the Wisconsin United for Health Foundation.424
At 71 years old, it is clear Howard Fuller is not slowing down. His resolve to continue
fighting to provide opportunities for low-income blacks is clear in the current BAEO
mission, “to increase access to high-quality educational options for Black children by
actively supporting parental choice policies and programs that empower low-income and
working-class Black families.”425 School choice has been expanding throughout the
country with the help of Howard Fuller and BAEO, and will continue to be an important
part of educational policy in the coming years. Recent activity in Wisconsin, along with
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an upcoming 2012 presidential election, has forced a conversation about school choice
and accountability invoking passionate responses from both sides of the aisle. Based on
his life and activism, it is likely Howard Fuller will be engaged in these battles.
What it means to be a race man, or the importance of such a figure seems to be
changing over time. Dwight A. McBride discussed this in his essay, “Toward the New
Black Studies: Or Beyond the Old Race Man,” arguing, “We are ready to move beyond
the centrality of the lone ‘race man’ standing at the precipice between a monolithic
Blackness and the rest of the world broadcasting a prêt-a-porter version of Black life.”426
Calling for the stories of black life in the United States to be complicated, McBride
challenged the strength of the concept of the race man. While the definition may be
challenged or shift over time, Fuller’s life shows it is not time to simply move beyond the
idea of the race man. His dedication to providing access to educational opportunities to
low-income blacks, and the personal sacrifices he has made to do so, reinforces the power
a race man can hold and the changes they can bring. In the spirit of its original meaning;
Howard Fuller is a man “intent on ‘advancing the race’ by working as a role model, both
to uplift the ghetto community and to disabuse the wider society of its often negative
view of blacks.”427 From Milwaukee, to Waukesha, to Cleveland, to Durham, to
Mozambique, and back again, this has been Howard Fuller’s life’s work. As the work,
not the job which facilitates that work, has always been most important, at 71 years old it
seems clear that Howard Fuller has not, and will not ever stop working for the increased
opportunities and decreased discrimination of low-income blacks across the country.
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